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22 July 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SYRIAN MINISTER DISCUSSES OIL POLICY AFTER OPAEP

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 9 Jun 80 p 4

[Interview with Abdel Jabbar Eddahak, Syrian minister of petroleum and mineral resources, by A. Zouied]

[Text] Before leaving Algiers at the conclusion of the 24th OPAEP meeting, Abdel Jabbar Eddahak, Syrian minister of oil and mineral resources, met with us to outline his country's energy policy. This policy, he told us, was characterized by a low rate of oil production, on the order of ten million tons of crude per year.

The two petroleum refineries, at Homs and Tabarias, are not operating at full capacity, he said, as Syria was not yet interested in utilizing their intrinsic capacity.

"What characterizes Syrian energy policy is that all the experts, executives, and engineers are Syrian nations, from production to refinery.

"As for exploration, we are hoping to bring to light other wells, while experimenting with substitute sources of energy. For this we have created a commission and according to their studies we can expect our wells to run dry in about 30 years, at the present rate of production.

"As concerns gas," Mr Abdel Jabbar said, "Syria has started a liquification project, with a capacity of 11 billion cubic meters per year. This is not a negligible amount for our economy.

"Also," he added, "we are counting on exploiting natural gas and in this context, I visited Arzew while I was here in Algeria. There I talked with Algerian managers and engineers, who made a very good impression.

"We are hoping to profit from Algeria's experience in this domain as well as in the domain of the refinery."

Syrian gas reserves will last only 15 years at a rate of 90 billion cubic meters during that time, was Abdel Jabbar's opinion.

Asked about Syria's pricing policy, Mr Jabbar indicated that OPEC prices were taken into account in Syria's price formula, with increases and decreases according to the quality of the oil.

He also made clear to us that since Syria was not a member of OPEC because of its low production, it was not bound by OPEC prices.

Referring to the privileged role petroleum plays in his country's national development, Mr Abdel Jabbar emphasized its importance as much in relation to the gross national product (GNP) as to the needs of industrial and agricultural development, initiated during the 1970 recovery.

"Thanks to oil," he said, "we can envisage a variety of projects which will assure our country of greater progress."

"To this end," he stressed, "we have asked Algeria to strengthen our bilateral cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector. An agreement on principles has been concluded."

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

NO MORE PLENTIFUL DIRT CHEAP ENERGY

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 9 Jun 80 p 1

[Article by A. Zouied]

[Text] In line with preceding sessions, OPEC's 57th ministerial meeting opens today in Algiers against a background of a world economy sorely tried by the manipulations of the industrialized countries, in a context of constraint, with the objective of examination of different aspects of supply and demand of oil, and is obviously moved, beyond the maneuvers to thwart it, by the desire to bring more calm to international economic relations and to open up new perspectives.

Thus it must be deduced that the member countries are not only expected to harmonize their oil prices, but to show their collective capacity to fully assume their responsibilities internationally concerning the crisis gripping the North-South dialog.

Nothing would be more contrary to this disposition to make cooperation prevail over tension, than to obstinately block or postpone by subterfuges the process already begun to valorize our riches, to annihilate its effect, or to cast blame with the support of a panoply of premises, totally false, not to say conceptually erroneous.

If it should prove impossible to control the deliberately exacerbated inflation, to stockpile oil, to say nothing of the induced fall of the dollar, now become what can only be called 'monkey money', it will not be surprising if the OPEC countries would be led, without any other choice, to have recourse to measures of preservation touching on production levels, until the industrialized countries return to reason.

It goes without saying that it will be essential to take into consideration the prices set for the foods and manufactured products sold to the OPEC and Third World countries, the conditions for transfer of technology and for credit which economists put among the causes of our underdevelopment being accentuated rather than lessened, and of the deterioration in exchange terms. Parameters that the strategists of the OECD probably won't be able

to assimilate, their economic thought being stuck in the past, but whose shock waves will be heavily supported by the underdeveloped countries. In any case, the era of selling off energy dirt cheap is over. This is why, turned together towards the future, it cannot be but agreed that it is absurd to attempt to break OPEC solidarity, to beat about the bush and distract public opinion from the real problems confronting the entire international community and which do not rise from the domain of energy alone.

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REAL WAR RATHER THAN GUERRILLA WARFARE AGAINST SOVIETS

Paris LE POINT in French 16 Jun 80 pp 49-51

[Article by Jerome Marchand; "USSR: the Afghan Hornet's Nest"]

[Text] In Afghanistan, a real war--not guerrilla warfare any longer--now pits the Moslem guerrillas against the Soviet troops. And nothing guarantees that the Russians will win for sure.

It was 6 months ago--27 December, to be exact. On that night, they disembarked--regiment after regiment, division after division--from their gigantic Antonov 22's, flocking onto the cold Kabul airport. Well-armed, well-shod, with their grey fur shapkas pulled down over their ears, they were, as is said, impeccable from every point of view. Scarcely surprised by the mission assigned to them: helping the new Afghan revolutionary government threatened by the "imperialists." And anxious to bring the "fraternal Pax Sovietica."

Who could have barred their way? When 85,000 of the best soldiers of the Red Army land in force somewhere, one realizes what "realpolitik" represents. Twelve years after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and no one could imagine anything other than the crushing of the Afghan people and the end of them.

Dying for Kabul. This is what Sergeant Ivanov is going to learn in Afghanistan. Like the frightened young German recruits in Erich Maria Remarque's novel "All Quiet on the Western Front," more and more soldiers in the ranks of the Red Army are dying: 300 dead in April, more than 300 in May. And at the very gates of Kabul. This is something new and extraordinary--they are no longer fighting only in the cold valleys of Khunar, of Paktia, on the Pakistani border, but also in the vineyards close to the capital.

Last week, for 5 days, clay-colored Mig 21's and green MI 24 helicopters bombed, "napalmed" the mountains of Dhoman-e-Kho (literally, "the skirt of the mountain"), a small chain northwest of Kabul where perhaps 5,000 or 10,000 rebels have taken refuge--the biggest muster ever seen in Afghanistan. For the first time, coming down from the high country, its usual geo-

graphical area, the Moslem rebellion, which is described as so weak, so divided, so poorly armed, has taken the risk of threatening Kabul, a camp that has dug in and is protected by more than 2,000 tanks and two divisions of the Red Army. The reply was withering: the Soviet general staff immediately decided not only to close off the region but also to bomb the Moslem rebels, who had been joined also by deserters from the Afghan regular army. Simultaneously, more than 12,000 troops--including, it appears, airborne commandos--left the garrisons of Tashkent and Samarkand, in the USSR, to reinforce the capital's security perimeter.

Contrary to what is asserted by RED STAR, the organ of the Soviet army, insecurity has propagated in Afghanistan today. Scarcely a month ago, 8 of Afghanistan's 30 provinces were considered secure. This is no longer the case. From Badarkshan, a province right up against the Chinese border, to the Iranian border, from Baluchistan to Jalalabad, the Red Army is bogging down. Not that it could suffer an Afghan version of the "retreat from Russia"--matters have not reached that point. The main roads--at least what remains of them--the provincial capitals, the principal airports, are under Soviet control.

But all the same! The recent fighting around Kabul, the multiplication of skirmishes, the incessant attacks on convoys, the rise in Soviet losses, show that one does not occupy Afghanistan without paying the price. Aggravating circumstances for the USSR, two myths that it carefully maintained are collapsing in the face of the deterioration of the situation. The first has it that the rebellion is orchestrated in the CIA camps located, essentially, in Pakistan. Now how is it to be explained that the fighting rages more than 150 kilometers from the closest frontier? The second is both simpler and more serious for a society as militarized as the Soviet: against a rebellion by "bandits," in the propaganda's own terms, the Red Army does not appear invincible.

"Failure." This diplomat, very knowledgeable about Afghan affairs from having served in the region for a long time, makes an even more severe judgment. According to him, Moscow, intervening last December, has totally failed in the two fundamental tasks it had assigned itself. The first was to throttle the guerrilla warfare with the help of the Afghan army. Absurd. When one sees these patched-up soldiers kneeling on a roadside in the direction of Mecca five times a day, like the mujahiddin (the fighters of Islam) in their mountains, one sees how eager a Moslem soldier would be to shoot at another Moslem, even if he is a "rebel."

The present government of Babrak Karmal tried hard by increasing pay (miserable) and the Bulgarian canned rations (atrocious), but nothing has helped. Urged on by Soviet instructors who ask them to sacrifice themselves during the day and then take away their weapons at night, the Afghan recruits--fewer than 30,000--prefer desertion. The consequence: the Afghan authorities have decreed conscription, and round up in the environs of Kabul boys who are not 15 years old. And the Soviets are now taking on all the "pacification" campaigns. But the four mopping-up operations launched in the Khunar

valley, the Shesni valley, the Bessud valley, have resulted not in elimination of the guerrilla action but in an unprecedented exodus of 700,000 refugees to Pakistan. Without the ceaseless action of the Red Cross and humanitarian organizations such as International Action against Hunger (which has just launched in Paris a campaign entitled "Convoys for Afghanistan"), people would be dying inexorably in the tent camps around Peshawar.

The second failure--by far the more serious one--of the objectives fixed by Moscow is the nonexistence of Babrak Karmal's government, which arrived on 27 December in the Soviet trucks. Its sole achievement is the new colors of the Afghan flag. Like its head, Babrak Karmal, hovered over by a bodyguard, a chauffeur, a doctor and six advisers, all Soviets, this government can officiate only under the protection of the red bayonets.

Elementary protection makes this necessary. This government, composed, in its majority, of Parchamis (the members of one of the two factions of the Afghan Communist Party, which bloodily took the place of the Khalk faction of Taraki and Afizullah), lives under the daily threat of assassination attempts and revenge. The "Khalkis"--Marxists, said to be tough, resolutely more nationalist than the Parchamis--have always had it in for the Parchamis, not only for having been thrown out of power but also because the Parchamis took power thanks to the Soviets. Khalkis and Parchamis have not finished settling accounts between themselves.

What, indeed, was being shouted on 28 and 29 April by the hundreds of high-school students who cut their classes to demonstrate in the very center of Kabul? Not only "Death to the Russians" but also "Death to Babrak," the president guilty "of having sold his country." A date in Afghanistan's history. For a "feudal" country still accustomed to the droit du seigneur (according to Georges Marchais), to see and hear Afghan nationalism expressed directly by women is probably significant of the fever that now stirs people's minds. On that day, the Parcham's militiamen fired. Atrocious scenes, it is said. Adolescents fell to the ground. That evening, the prisons were full. How can one be surprised if there is a threat of urban terrorism in Kabul?

On one night last week, 16 Soviet soldiers were killed. Two weeks earlier, a Soviet general was killed by a sniper in front of the Malalail high school. The governor of Baniyan province, suspected of sympathizing with the regime, was eliminated. And today, the "red lists" that name each communist for popular contumely circulate openly. The risk is obvious: the increase in assassinations engenders Soviet repression.

Some already believe they see the premonitory symptoms of this. According to them, the USSR is considering not leaving Afghanistan but rather installing itself there permanently. The examples they cite: the construction of two permanent bridges across the Oxus, the river which, to the north of Mazar-i-Sharif, separates the Afghan steppes from the great plains of Soviet Asia; the construction of permanent silos for storing fuel as well as munitions; the widening of the Salang road, the umbilical cord that conveys 80

percent of military road traffic; the extension of Soviet officers' service time in Afghanistan to 2 years.

All right. But in this case, how can one help but think of the inevitable difficulties that would result and which the Kremlin probably does not hide from itself either? "We understand that you are having some difficult times. May our love enable you to overcome them." This letter by the wife of a Russian officer was published in PRAVDA of 5 June. This new tone, clearly contrasting with the recent reports, could signify that awareness of the severity of the task is gradually being acquired in the Soviet Union. Moreover, according to diplomats stationed in Kabul, the Soviet "bidasses," like their American "colleagues" in Vietnam, are not immune to the pains of being stuck in a trap. In other words, the black market, profiteering, and the appearance of hashish in the camps could weaken the morale of the Red Army as happened in Vietnam.

Moscow, of course, continues to declare that it intends to negotiate in the matter of Afghanistan only by way of the proposal presented by the Kabul government on 14 May. In other words, a negotiated settlement is contingent first of all on recognition of the government in place in Kabul, and secondly on cessation of the so-called counterrevolutionary aggression coming from Pakistan and Iran. The causes that led the government to ask for the "fraternal aid" of the USSR would thereby disappear by themselves. Only then will it be possible to establish the program for withdrawal of the Soviet troops. This is a working hypothesis that does not seem close to being realized. On the contrary, the Afghan resistance is giving proof of its vitality every day. Finally, on the diplomatic level, impasse prevails for now.

To date, the approaches made in the region by the Cuban minister of foreign relations and the secret and public meetings held to outline a solution have not produced even the shadow of a result. The personality most recently received in Moscow to work for a political solution was Narasimha Rao, the Indian minister of external relations. Despite his efforts, he did not manage to shake Andrei Gromyko's determination to have the legitimacy of the Kabul revolutionary government recognized.

Does this mean, then, that the Soviet authorities are going to continue their attempts to convince the entire world of the irreversibility of the situation in Afghanistan? This is not so certain. As some mutter at the Quai d'Orsay, "irreversible" is a term that rarely enters the political vocabulary. If one believes them, the Kremlin still has two possible ways. The first--the present one--is that of the "pile-driver trying to crush bugs," as a diplomat says with a smile. It takes account of the fact that it will take time to make Afghanistan toe the line.

The other way, the more difficult one, would consist in taking all the consequences, on the international level, of an unfortunate military intervention. Because of the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets have no chance of modifying the data of an international environment that they have been de-

nouncing for months, an increase of about 5 percent in the United States' defense budget; the installation, starting in 1983, of the Pershing II rockets and Cruise missiles in the FRG and certain other countries of the Atlantic Alliance; not to mention the discussions that are agitating the Western general staffs with regard to the neutron bomb. In a word, "withdrawal" perhaps does not suit the Soviets. But does one ever know? When a political situation appears frozen at a point like this, when the vast majority of the international community rises up against "invasion," one sometimes has to put some water in one's wine. Especially if the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan today behave like the characters in the film "The Heroes Are Tired Out."

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AFGHANISTAN

SOVIETS KILL 15 STUDENTS, WOUND 50 IN KABUL

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 24 May 80 p 3

[Text] Once again soldiers in Kabul opened fire on students, killing 12 male and 3 female students and wounding 50 others. Travelers arriving at New Delhi said that girl students of Malalah school were demonstrating outside their school against the presence of Soviet forces. Later, some armed male students arrived at the scene to protect the girl students from Afghan soldiers who were already pointing their machine guns at them. Thereupon, the soldiers opened reckless fire, killing 12 male and 3 female students. Sixty students, including 35 female, had already died as a result of shooting by Afghan soldiers, creating an extremely tense atmosphere.

A few days ago, while the students were gathering outside Malalah school to bitterly protest the presence of Soviet troops and their part in the violent shooting by the Afghan soldiers, the soldiers again opened fire, without provocation and without giving any warning. Travelers reaching New Delhi estimate that 12 students have been killed and wounded while others put the number of wounded at 20.

It may be noted that students have been demonstrating in Kabul and Jalalabad for the last 4 weeks against the presence of Soviet forces and advisors. The capital rang with automatic gunfire all night long. BBC reports that for the first time, girl students were accompanied by armed male students.

According to a report received last Tuesday, a large arsenal depot was destroyed 5 miles from Kabul. That was one of the three main stores recently built in the suburbs of Kabul for the Soviet troops. The entire area was darkened with smoke after the explosion. The next day Kabul Radio, to cover up the fact, broadcast the news of a fire caused by the collision of two oil-carriers. But the organization of Afghan Mujahids in their announcement claimed responsibility for the explosion of the arsenal and oil depot of the Soviet army. Kabul Radio finally confirmed the report of the explosion, condemning it as a subversive activity. According to AFP, 3 Soviet soldiers and 5 members of the Afghan militia were killed in the incident. The sound of the explosion could be heard as far away as Kabul. Officials have closed all roads leading to Malalah.

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BRIEFS

SOVIETS RETREAT AT GHAZNI--According to reports received from Afghanistan, an attack launched by the Soviet and Afghan forces in the hills of Ghazni has been thwarted. A heavy battle was fought between the Majahids and Soviet and Afghan troops which eventually ended up on the retreat. Two hundred Soviets have been reportedly killed and dozens of tanks and armored vehicles destroyed in the battle which was fought at Jaghato, 170 kilometers from Kabul. The number of Afghan soldiers killed has not been given. The force withdrawn from Jaghato was later directed to attack Jaghori, an area located to the south of Ghazni, inhabited by the Hazara tribe. According to another report, the Soviet Union has sent 600 tanks and armored vehicles to attack on Jaghori. It is also reported from Kabul that the areas of Baghlan, Kanduz, Khandad, and Talukan are practically controlled by the Majahids. All government offices have been closed and advisors and technical experts from East European countries and India have left for Kabul. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAOT in Urdu 22 May 80 p 4] 9484

CSO: 4203

PLANS AIMED AT OVERTHROW OF 'REVOLUTIONARY REGIME'

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 21 Jun 80 p 9

[Text] According to news reports, an Iranian named 'Ali Akbar Tabataba'i, who was a press liason in Washington for the former regime, an intimate of Ardeshir Zahedi, the last ambassador of the deposed Shah to the United States, and a CIA intermediary in the coup d'etat of 28 Mordad [19 August 1953], has announced that General Gholam'ali Oveysi and Shapur Bakhtiar have organized a military outfit in Iraq from Iranian exiles. Tabataba'i's statement was published in a great many international newspapers. Some of them considered and termed these words a bluff by associates of the former regime in order to fleece some U.S. organizations, Iranian refugee millionaires and the Iraqi government. All the supporters of these individuals do not exceed several thousand persons, and their activities have been limited to the publication of one or two announcements and the holding of a couple of interviews.

According to the newspaper LE MONDE, intimates of Shapur Bakhtiar in Paris confirmed Tabataba'i's statement, and said that the commandos have taken up positions on the Iran-Iraq border. The commandos are composed of Kurds and Arabic-speaking Iranians. However, 'Abdolrahman Qasemlu, general secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party, denied any cooperation whatsoever between the Kurds and "fugitive agents of the former regime." He announced that the Kurds rebelled against the past regime, had a large share in the victory of the revolution, and that their present struggle is for the extension of democracy all across Iran, not to return the detested past regime.

Newspapers report that the Iraqi government has recently placed several million dollars at the disposal of the associates of the former Iranian regime, and that an alliance has been created between Generals Oveysi and Palizban, and Shapur Bakhtiar. The goal of this alliance is the overthrow of the revolutionary regime and the creation of a powerful military dictatorship for a period of two years. After that time a referendum would be held in Iran. After a trip to Baghdad, General Oveysi visited the United States, and had meetings with some officials of that country. Shapur Bakhtiar traveled to Switzerland, which is Ardeshir Zahedi's place of residence.

From another direction, a number of supporters of a monarchical regime in recent days have organized a group called "Shahanshahi-ye Iran." In Germany they announced their goal to be the restoration of the monarchy in Iran, but without the Pahlavi family. This groups' announcement said that the first shah of the Pahlavi family was a British puppet and the second a U.S. puppet, and that the corruption of this family caused not only its overthrow but the destruction of the monarchy in Iran. Therefore the "Shahanshahi-ye Iran" group, which supports a monarchical form of government, suggests that an outstanding personality be designated as a candidate for the monarch's position.

In Paris in recent days some of the intimates of Farah Diba, the deposed Shah's last wife, have been talking about enthroning 'Alireza, the second child of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. These individuals consider the closeness of the deposed Shah's generals and Shapur Bakhtiar to be the result of the mediation of Ashraf Pahlavi and Ardeshir Zahedi. They state that since there is no chance whatsoever for the return of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi or even his eldest son to Iran, it is better to nominate his second child in order to preserve the possibility of the reestablishment of the monarchy.

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'KOMITEHS' CALLED ON FOR MORE TASKS

Protection of Harvests

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 27 May 80 p 12

[Text] The following announcement was issued by the Supervisor of the Islamic Revolution Central Komiteh, in connection with the mobilization of all Komitehs for protection and preservation of the harvests. The text of the announcement is as follows: The season for reaping the profit from the labor of the hardworking and oppressed Iranian people has arrived. Agents who are to all appearances leftists and supporters of the people!, are really exploiting imperialists and anarchists who have united. They intend to destroy the result of the labor of the farmers and the deprived people in order to save their aggressor masters from another defeat.

It is requested that pursuant to the repeated warnings of the revolution's leader, all Komitehs across the country mobilize for protection and preservation of the harvest, patrol alertly night and day, and keep suspicious individuals under close watch. In accordance with the order of the Revolution Public Prosecutor, refer all cases of violation to the nearest Revolution Public Prosecutor's office.

It is not necessary that people be wearing special clothes or uniforms in order to identify and arrest anti-people criminals.

In conclusion, we ask the favor of all responsible Moslem brothers and sisters to cooperate with the Guardsmen in the protection of the harvests and in prevention and identification of counterrevolutionary persons.

Supervisor of the Islamic Revolution Central Komiteh

Liquidating Counter-Revolutionaries

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 24 May 80 p 4

[Interview with Hojjatoleslam Hasani]

[Text] Urmia--Our reporter has a special interview with Hojjatoleslam Hasani, Friday prayer leader, representative of the Imam, representative

of the people of Urmia in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and official responsible for the Komitehs of the West Azerbaijan District. Our correspondent asked his views concerning his visit to the Imam, and the Majles priorities he believes in. In this interview, Urmia's Friday prayer leader referred to issues including security, purging the bureaus, and harmonizing schools, universities, teachers' colleges, and scientific centers with the Koran's life-giving instructions. The text of our reporter's interview with Hojjatoleslam Hasani is as follows:

[Question] In your visit with the Imam what issues were brought up?

[Answer] In the name of the Merciful, the Compassionate. Before we went to the Imam, we held a seminar of officials from Iran's Komitehs. In this seminar, several individuals spoke, among them myself, Ayatollah Kani, Ayatollah Ehsani, and one of the clergy from Kermanshah named Mr Haqatalab. In this seminar I propounded the theory that the Komitehs are completely independent and should not be combined with any other revolutionary organization. As it turned out, the Komiteh officials unanimously accepted my theory, and asked me to represent them in bringing this issue up in the presence of the Imam. The only other remaining issue was how to provide for the Komitehs. My view in this matter was that the collection of religiously sanctioned funds, such as the Khoms [1/5th of income], alms, the Imam's property, and other funds which from the spiritual point of view are obligatory, should become compulsory. The Komitehs, which rose up from the heart of the nation and society, and which are national, should be provided for from these funds.

[Question] What decisions were made concerning the nation-wide Komitehs after meeting with the Imam?

[Answer] In the presence of the Imam I stated that the Shi'ite clergy from the inception of the Shi'ite world, and particularly since the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam, until now have been independent, and were not salaried employees or stipendiaries of the government. The Komitehs should remain, the clergy should not be salaried employees of the government, they should be independent. God forbid, if one day a deviation appears in the path of the revolution, the Komitehs, the responsible clergy, and the people will fend off this deviation. As you have seen and heard on national television and radio and read in the newspapers, the Imam entrusted this matter to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. After meeting with the Imam, another seminar was held in which Komiteh officials were present; my brothers gave me a mandate to propound this subject in the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

The Independence and Existence of the Komitehs

[Question] If the independence of the Komitehs were approved, what relation would the Komitehs have with city police forces?

[Answer] Because both Komitehs and city police will be independent, each of them will be charged with a duty. The Komitehs rose up from the heart

of the nation and society to crush counterrevolutionaries. I believe that even if they do not achieve independence, the Komitehs should exist at least as long as there are counterrevolutionaries in Iran. The city police should investigate normal complaints.

Main Items in Proposals to Islamic Consultative Assembly

[Question] Since you are the representative of the people Urmia in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, what suggestions will you have for the improvement of conditions in the Azerbaijan district?

[Answer] Just as I pointed out during my Friday sermons, the main points of my suggested program for the Majles will be as follows: 1) Martyrs' Foundation: Because the heroic nation of Iran did not revolt for materialism, because it sacrificed life, wealth and position in order to establish God's government, because it gave 60,000 martyrs before and more than 10,000 martyrs after the victory of the revolution, the families of martyrs must be provided for and should not be in strained circumstances. Recently a Martyrs' Foundation was founded on the order of the Imam; it must be strengthened more.

Insuring Security

The essential condition for security is martyrdom. For this very reason I have placed the Martyrs' Foundation at the head of my proposals to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The Islamic Consultative Assembly, chosen by the Iranian nation, must decisively and completely exterminate 100 percent of the counterrevolutionaries, and produce security for the heroic Iranian nation.

Purging the Bureaus

Bureaus must be purged in three stages; first, counterrevolutionary persons; second, inefficient persons; third, indifferent persons.

With such persons in the factories, offices and the army, the nation's economy has been crippled; they keep us dependent just as before. The eyes of all the world's oppressed are on our revolution to see what the result will be. We must strive so that the Iranian revolution is not confined and we must export our revolution to all the world. The revolution cannot move forward with inefficiency and indifference. We must try to work as hard as we can and reach the stage of self-sufficiency.

4) Fourthly, all schools, universities, teachers colleges, high schools and scientific centers must be in harmony with the instructions of the Koran. Foreign programs and colonialist and exploitative lessons must be completely deracinated from our society. After the martyrdom of thousands, we cannot bear to see professors and teachers in the universities and schools throw our pure and innocent children into the lap of the United States and the USSR. Such professors and teachers must be purged totally.

Agricultural Self-Sufficiency

5) At the present there are about 165 million hectares of arable land in Iran. Unfortunately only 8 million hectares of that is under cultivation. Of this 8 million hectares, 4 million are short of water and use dry farming. I suggest that the utmost importance be given to agriculture. For this task, deep and medium-deep wells must be dug in the villages. Interest-free loans must be made to farmers, so that through greater production we reach self-sufficiency.

6) Public welfare facilities for our rural brothers and sisters must be made available, such as electricity, water, asphalted roads, baths, hospitals, pharmacies and other welfare facilities.

7) Such as I said at the beginning of the interview, religiously sanctioned funds such as the khoms, tithe, Imam's property, and taxes must be collected through the highest level of compulsion; between the rich and oppressed they will produce equality and brotherhood.

8) City populations must be reduced and be drawn to the villages.

9) Special attention should be given to the slum areas, and facilities for the welfare and comfort of the poor must be made available.

9597

CSO: 4906

BANI-SADR WARNS PEOPLE TO OPPOSE 'OPPORTUNISTS'

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 14 Jun 80 p 15

[Text] Sari--President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr addressed the people of Sari yesterday talking about post-revolutionary problems and their solution.

Speaking to thousands of people who had gathered at Azadi Stadium, Bani-Sadr said that eradication of absolute individual rule and its replacement by the rule of law, in an effort to make men accustomed to law and order and enable them to free themselves from the grips of oppressors, had been the mission of all the prophets throughout the ages.

Bani-Sadr added: "From the beginning to the end Koran recognizes no other ruler but God, and throughout human history prophets, thinkers and nations had risen to overthrow oppressive systems and replace them by the rule of law. Then, why is it that the rule of law is pushed aside after a while and is again replaced by oppression? Why is the Administration of Ali Ben Abi-Taleb, which was at the service of the oppressed and the needy lasted for only five years? My personal experience tells me that the reason for the failure lie within rather than without. Imam does not approve of individual will, whether that of himself or of others."

The president then described achievements of the past three months such as the reestablishment of relative security, reduction in unemployment, increased production activities and the return of order and discipline in the army. He said that the country had now reached the stage of fundamental and basic changes. He said that if the executive branch failed in its implementation of the law people will despair. He noted that transformation of legal governments into absolute systems was the end result of public despair. He also added that revolution was not meant to mean that the power of the son of Reza Khan should be replaced by, for example, the power of Bani-Sadr. He warned that if the rule of law was not restored oppression would return, sooner or later.

Assisting Officials

The President further declared: "If you want the revolution to continue and the laws of Koran to govern, your first duty is to assist officials

to implement the law. Ask for officials who want to rule by the law and in electing them their honesty and ability should be the main consideration. Officials should not be chosen because of political, factional or ideological reasons. One thing more, to achieve your goals you should strive through legal means."

In another part of his address, the President said: "I am convinced that if people knew their bound and did not try to go beyond it the country will be able to quickly resolve its problems and move forward again."

Oppose Opportunists

Bani-Sadr added: "Another factor that could turn revolutions into counter revolution and help replace free and legal governments by oppressive systems was that of the leaders of revolution becoming involved in a power struggle. If you do not want the return of dictatorial regime to Iran you must carefully choose your officials and leaders. You should not fear criticizing them and if you find them leaning toward oppressive methods, you should not hesitate reminding them. Opportunists should not be given the field. You should not be fooled by demonstrations and the way issues are being presented. Whenever you feel you are being encouraged to break the law you can be sure that your best interest is not being served. Opportunists know quite well how to act in different conditions and how to project themselves. So, if you want your Islamic revolution to succeed you must reject the elements of corruption in your society."

At this point, in response to a question about the present high prices, the President explained the noneconomic factors for the high prices of consumer goods.

Answering the question of another person in the audience, who had asked the opinion of the President about capitalists, Bani-Sadr said: "A capitalist is one who enjoys economic power. But it must be remembered that those who have political power are capitalist also. We want all these capitalists to forego their power. The one who wants to resolve problems by resorting to force and the one who tries to do the same by using tricks is a capitalist too. Their capital is composed of power and arms. If you want capitalism to disappear, everybody must put down their sticks and allow the law to rule."

9561

CSO: 4906

ELECTION OF 164 MAJLES DEPUTIES APPROVED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 9 Jun 80 p 2

[Text] At an open session yesterday, the Islamic Consultative Assembly approved election credentials of 47 deputies. The session, presided over by seniority president Dr Yadollah Sahabi, was opened by the president reading a letter of invitation from Libya which had been submitted to the Majles by the Libyan embassy in Tehran inviting ten or more members of the Majles to attend that country's independence ceremonies. Opposition by one of the deputies was met by protests from other deputies and it was finally agreed that the ten committees meet at the end of the open session and each choose one deputy for the purpose.

Credentials of 8 Deputies Submitted to the Investigation Committee

Because of opposition by a number of deputies, election credentials of 8 deputies were returned to the investigation committee for further examination.

Deputies whose election credentials were approved are as follows:

Mohammad Ghaffari from Salmas
 Mohammad Amin Sazegarneshtad from Lorestan
 Dr Yadollah Sahabi from Tehran
 Ali Akbar Velayati from Tehran
 Dr Mohammad Javad Bahonar from Tehran
 Seyyed Ali Khameneh'i from Tehran
 Mehdi Shahabadi from Tehran
 Dr Mostafa Chamran from Tehran
 Mohsen Mojtahed Shabestari from Tehran
 Ms. Gowhar Alshari'e Dast-e Gheyb from Tehran
 Seyyed Mohammad Khoeyniha from Tehran
 Hadi Ghaffari from Tehran
 Mohammad Javad Hojjati Kermani from Tehran
 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani from Tehran
 Hassan Ebrahim Habibi from Tehran
 Ahmad Beheshti from Fasa
 Mostafa Fumeni Haeri from Fumen

Jalal Shirazian from Qa'em Shahr
 Seyyed Ali Naqi Naqavi from Qa'enat
 Mohammad Yazdi from Qom
 Mohammad Taqi Kamalinia from Quchan
 Taheri from Kazerun
 Ismail Kashani from Kashan
 Manuchehr Mottaki from Bandar Turkeman, Kordkuy, Bandar Gaz and Gomish-Tappeh
 Seyyed Abbas Yunesi from Kangavar
 Mohammad Reza'Abbasi Fard from Kuhdasht of Lorestan
 Ja'far Shajuni from Karaj
 Mohammad Reza Hanjani from Karaj
 Samad Shuja'ian from Mamassani
 Seyyed Sajjad Hojjati from Mianeh
 Mohammad Ali Montaseri Najafabadi from Najafabad
 Shams'oddin Hoseyni from Na'in
 'Abbas'Ali Nateq Nuri from Nur
 Abdul Hosseyn Jalali from Neyshabur
 Hosseyn Ansari from Neyshabur
 Dr Seyyed Reza Pakneshad from Yazd
 Seyyed Hashem Hamidi from Hamadan
 Ali Aqa Mohammadi from Hamadan
 Esmad'oddin Karim Bishaninezhad from Nowshahr
 Mohammad Ali Heydari from Nahavand
 Reza Esfahani from Varamin
 Seyyed Ahmad Mostafavi from Natanz and Qamsar
 Khachaturian, Armenians in Esfahan and the south
 Huseybr Khalatian, Armenians in the north
 Dr Beyt Ouhana, Assyrians and Kaldanians
 Sheykh'Abbas'Abbasi from Minab

Following are the deputies whose election credentials were returned to the investigation committee for reexamination:

Dr Musa Zargar from Shahryar
 Dr Seyyed Hassan Ayat from Tehran
 Sadeq Khaikhal from Qom
 Rumpur Sadr Nabavi from Kashmar
 Seyyed Abol Hassan Hoseyni from Minudasht
 Seyyed Ja'far Hojjat Kashfi from Neyriz and Estahban
 Assadollah Javanmardi from Mianeh
 Ashaq Parahmandpur of the Jewish community

Election records of files of Qasr-e Shirin, Gazvin and Kerman were sent to the committee for examination.

Eighth Branch Proposal

After the submission of the election credentials to the eighth branch, the committee reporter, Ja'far Shanjuni, read a proposal that had been drafted

by the committee members. It was proposed that because of ambiguity in a number of documents submitted to the committee, final judgement should rest until after a final and thorough examination of their contents. Deputies whose cases are being reexamined should not be accused of anything, as SAVAK used to do, until after the investigation of various cases. This will help preserve the integrity of the Majles. Members of the committee, therefore, suggest that deputies should abide by the Islamic laws and principles, for if innuendo is allowed to be carried too far, it will only damage the nation's reputation.

Postscript

After the election credential of Seyyed Abol Hassan Hoseyni from Minudasht was examined at the open session and was approved and the approval was announced by the speaker of the Majles, Sadeq Khalkhali, who had been sitting quietly, suddenly broke the silence and voiced his objection. Asked why he was objecting after it had been approved by the Majles, he said he had not been paying attention.

Among the deputies who voiced objection to the election credentials of Dr Musa Margar and Seyyed Hassan Ayat yesterday was Ahmad Salamatian. When he was voicing his objection to Dr Zargar's credentials, Dr Radi noted that he, Salamatian, had told a gathering that he intended to voice opposition to credentials of all the deputies at today's session. But the speaker of the Majles said that credentials of five deputies had been floored and he had not opposed anyone of them.

Hojjatolislam Ma'adikhah proposed that if it were proved that a deputy had deliberately tried to smear another deputy by false accusation, he should be expelled from the Majles. To this the speaker replied that the Majles had no right to pass such a procedure.

Finally, contrary to the past sessions during which the speaker by seniority always wore a tie, he did not wear one yesterday. Strangely enough, engineer Bazargan was not wearing a tie either. An observer, trying to solve the mystery, said could it be that the harmony between the speaker by seniority and the deputy speaker is limited only to the way they dress?

Election credentials of a total of 164 deputies have been approved so far. This number does not provide a quorum and considering that 28 credentials have been submitted to the committee for reexamination, and the fact that some of them are incomplete and will face opposition, it is doubtful that the quorum of 180 could be achieved today or tomorrow.

9561

CSO: 4906

ECONOMY TO STRESS SMALL, MEDIUM INDUSTRIES

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 26 Jun 80 p 10

[Article by Pe.: "Tehran Continues To Build an Islamic Economic Structure"]

[Text] Duesseldorf--Even today, the leading groups in Iran do not see an alternative to continuing industrialization. It is, however, to take place at a much lower level and be geared more to the elementary needs of the population with greater consideration for the small and medium sized industries, according to the official German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Tehran has expressed these thoughts.

The Chamber of Commerce and Industry believes that there are no basic objections to large industrial production as such. For example, talks are being conducted now with the Japanese for the resumption of construction activities for the large petrochemical project in Bandar Khomeyni (formerly Bandar Shahpour). The planned construction of a copper refinery in Sar Cheshmeh should start getting underway. There even appears to be a willingness to complete the plant for the direct reduction of steel which was begun in Ahwaz. Right now, the leadership in Tehran appears to be more interested in maintaining the existing economic cycle, which is suffering at present from a lack of raw materials and semimanufactured products, difficulties with the workers and management, rather than further expanding industrial capacities. But one of the basic problems is the lack of a coherent economic policy.

There now appears to be another difficulty for further planning, namely a lack of money, which was not the case in Iran previously. According to recent reports, Tehran is now forced to hold back on the budget for the year 1359 (21 March 1980 to 20 March 1981), which has already been ratified by the Revolutionary Council, for the required money for these expenditures is not yet available. The annual budget plan projected about 23 billion dollars from oil exports and another 10 billion dollars from taxes and duties. A deficit of 7 billion dollars was calculated in the budget. But these computations only balance out if there is a daily export of 2 million barrels of oil. According to Iranian Oil Minister Moinefar, Iran is presently exporting only 1 million barrels but even the purchasing oil companies in

Iran think this estimate is too high. Present exports of oil are estimated at a maximum of 800,000 barrels of oil per day.

The individual details of the emergency budget are not yet quite clear. According to the Finance Ministry, "current expenditures" are supposed to be cut. The Official German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Tehran says that these cutbacks are composed of job firings or in a reduction in salaries. Purportedly, planned expenditures for "revolutionary organizations" are also supposed to be cut.

Up to now, the Tehran leadership has not presented a clear concept for the economy. Religious and political questions took priority for them. It is indeed stressed repeatedly that even the economy is supposed to be run according to a "closed, Islamic concept" but it is still unclear as to how these concepts will be converted into reality. State President Bani Sadr, who is considered the theoretician of such an Islamic economic order, has decisively marked off his concept from "capitalist" and "socialist" systems but has not yet presented any clear ideas.

Indications of what his concept would mean for foreign trade, as were expressed in the brochure of the Official German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Teheran "Iranian Economy 1979-1980."

The constitution, as stated in principle 44, assumes foreign trade to be part of the public sector whereby many possibilities for interpretation are left open. Accordingly the state is not forced to transact all foreign trade by means of state-owned firms but accords it the controls for trade which it deems necessary. So far, the first steps towards a new regulation of foreign trade have been set down pragmatically. State-owned purchasing companies have acquired expanded responsibilities. In sensitive import sectors, for example, in the case of paper, drugs, spare parts for automobiles, "trade centers" are supposed to be formed and act as controlling and guiding organs.

Experts do not yet dare to predict the direction of these developments. But the chamber believes that both large-scale continuation of private initiative, as provided in the markets in a relatively highly developed form, as well as an increased orientation to models of state exercise of power in the economy, such as Algeria, are conceivable.

The extent to which foreign investments will be affected by an Islamic economic order is also not yet certain. Concerning this the chamber states: "The interpretation of the word 'concessions,' which can only be translated approximately from the Persian to the German, still seems to be an open question just as is the question of any possible retroactive measures."

Up to now the only German investments affected were in the fields of banking and insurance. Questions of compensation have not yet been settled. According to the chamber, German investments in production areas have only been affected indirectly, that is, in cases where private Iranian partners had their shares nationalized.

Seen as a whole, since the revolution the state influence on industry, banking and foreign trade, which was already very great when the shah was in power, has grown even further. Even if the present leaders regard these as revolutionary measures it should not be overlooked that in many cases they were also practical emergency measures. The interlacing between previous political leaders and the business leaders left a vacuum in banking and in other parts of the industry after they fled abroad taking considerable sums of money with them and this condition was even exacerbated by the emigration of many "Western" educated technicians and managers. Therefore nationalization would have been unavoidable even without dogmatic reasons in order to prevent a collapse according to the Official German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry as stated in its report.

9527

CSO: 4403

'HA'ARETZ' CRITICIZES U.S. MILITARY POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST

TA061137 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Jul 80 p 9

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "U.S. Promises"]

[Text] At the height of the argument over the "triangular" deal in which Washington intended to sell Saudi Arabia 60 F-15 planes and tie up two other arms deals, with Israel and Egypt, a senior official from the U.S. State Department approached me. At the meeting it emerged that what was disturbing the senior official was the Israeli lobby's attack against the sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia. He brought with him a document containing detailed answers to all the claims and criticism raised by the Israeli lobby about the F-15 deal, arms deals in general with this Arab country and its role in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

It was apparent from the document that it had been composed by experts from the State Department and the Pentagon. He permitted me to use and publish the detailed replies, as well as comments such as that Saudi Arabia is no threat to Israel because it has no common border with it. There was a great deal of technical detail. What was instructive was that the first two issues dealt with by the document involved two of the weapons and systems Saudi Arabia now wants to purchase from the United States: The sophisticated AIM 9-L air-to-air missile and special fuel tanks for increasing the range of the F-15's.

I quote from the document. The State Department's reaction: The Saudi Arabian Air Force does not intend to purchase the AIM 9-L carried by the F-15's used by the U.S. Air Force. The document points out that, instead of this, the Saudis will use the air-to-air missile now carried by their F-5's (an excellent missile on its own merits, but less sophisticated). To calm down the senators and soften the Jewish lobby's complaint about the range of the F-15 the Saudis have, the State Department document says although the F-15 is capable of carrying weapons and external equipment weighing up to six tons, the U.S. Air Force has not adapted its planes to carry this weight. Each of the plane's weapon stations can carry a 2,000 pound bomb. Changes aimed at permitting the plane to carry additional ammunition are a most complicated matter and require U.S. authorization

and aid. External fuel tanks can be carried on these weapons stations. If these are used to carry bombs, the flight range will be decreased.

This was part of the technical explanation of why the F-15's are not especially dangerous to Israel and, in the final analysis, the Saudis will not be able to benefit from the full potential of these planes. A few weeks later some of these reasons became an official commitment, when U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sent a letter to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on 9 May 1978, in which Brown said, among other things (paragraph 5): The F-15 can carry three external fuel tanks, but the plane the Saudis are to receive will not be equipped to provide a longer flight range. These planes will not have the adapted fuel tanks (fitted) to the plane's body. The Saudi KC-135 tankers lack the equipment permitting the F-15 to be fueled in the air.

In paragraph 7 of his letter Harold Brown adds that Saudi Arabia neither asked for nor intends to purchase the equipment or weapons permitting an increased range or capability to attack ground targets.

Sharp, smooth and clear promises, both by the Saudis to the United States and by the U.S. secretary of defense to the Senate and by the Americans to Israel, in writing and verbally. The supply of F-15's to Saudi Arabia has not yet begun, but the Saudi promise has already been broken. The U.S. administration is not rejecting out of hand the Saudi demand to purchase systems they promised not to purchase, but has begun negotiations with Riyadh. For the moment, apparently because of the election campaign, the negotiations have been held up, but all the signs indicate that they are due to be resumed after the election.

It makes no difference now whether the Saudis want to embarrass the U.S. administration or whether they feel their power has increased while Israel's image is being worn away, and so they may try anything. The Americans are now trying to sell us new ideas, that in fact the Saudis could have purchased the special fuel tanks from the French (those who make this claim forget that one of the commitments the administration mentioned in 1978 also referred to the ban on changes and "adaptations" of this sort to the F-15's).

From Israel's viewpoint the conclusion is simple: Promises of this sort have a limited value from the beginning, and sometimes they are not worth the paper they are written on. From the aspect of Israel's security, those people were right who claimed and decided a long time ago that despite all the special political factors we must regard Saudi Arabia's military potential as a power that may be directed against us, and we must treat it as such.

From the operative aspect, therefore, it is worth our taking the time to examine another promise given by Israel to the United States in connection with Saudi Arabia. In the past the Saudis often complained to Washington that Israeli planes were making many sudden patrols over Saudi territory.

Washington was not content with passing on the complaint but demanded and demanded again and again that we refrain from doing this. Israel, of course, had a good reason to be concerned about developments in Saudi territory adjoining Israel, in the three airfields in the regions adjoining Jordan and, in particular, in the Tabuk base that is becoming a town and that may be the frontline base for the Saudi expeditionary force to Jordan and Syria, as it was at the end of the Yom Kippur war.

It seems to me that, in view of the latest developments, we should again make it clear that Israel cannot refrain from patrol and reconnaissance flights over various regions, including Saudi Arabia, where a threat to us may develop. The Saudis should understand that such an Israeli "promise" cannot be kept when the danger from them becomes more tangible. The need to keep our eyes open to what is happening in Saudi Arabia is an Israeli security duty. It is no less a duty than that we have concerning Jordan or Lebanon. It is important to make this point clear, publicly, in the United States, before the Americans make up their minds to sell the Saudis equipment and weapons they kept from them previously.

Israel does not regard the Saudi Arabian affair as something standing on its own, but as a symptom indicating an increasing and worrisome development in the military relations between Washington and several of the Arab countries: For example, Washington's latest "surrender," when it granted the Jordanian demand to supply weapons it had previously refused to sell. This takes the form, first of all, of the sale of modern tanks, although Jordan also purchases appreciable quantities of advanced tanks (Chieftain) from Britain. If Washington once insisted that every tank it sold to Jordan should replace an old tank taken out of service, it appears that this important principle has now been cancelled.

The symptom is also evident in Egypt. Israel completely understands the need to arm Egypt, but the complaint is that this is being done at a really dizzying speed, faster than what is required by the peace process. It is true that the Egyptians have additional security problems on their border with Libya and possible problems in Sudan, but even the most tolerant people do not think that because of this Egypt needs such a large army, armored and mechanized, and that it should be built so rapidly.

The relations developing between the United States and Egypt, on the one hand, and the modernization and organizational process the Jordanian Army is undergoing, with U.S. aid, on the other, are worth a separate, more detailed analysis. It is worth noting here that this development necessarily involves a deep, continuing negative affect on Israel. The flow of U.S. weapons to several Arab countries can only influence the Israeli planners, who must take the minimal essential steps at the same time to prevent the balance of forces from worsening. This places an enormous financial burden on Israel and, indirectly, is one of the factors preventing Israel's economic recovery.

So much for the economic aspect. Jordan's, Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's rapid rearming with modern weapons is also causing Israel strategic complications and this is leading to the dispersal of Israel's forces and a decrease in its ability to concentrate a great force at a time of need. This applies to its regiments and its air force, including the F-15's.

'AL HAMISHMAR' COMMENTS ON HUSAYN'S ATTITUDE

TA081325 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 8 Jul 80 p 1

[Editorial: 'Husayn's 'No's''']

[Text] King Husayn's attack-made during the Amman conference of the Arab foreign and finance ministers--on the Camp David accords, his reservations regarding the autonomy talks, the rejection of the possibility of holding talks with Israel and the presentation of the PLO as the chief partner to an agreement on the solution to the problem of the territories are all negatives raised by the Jordanian ruler that are reminiscent of the "no's" Egypt had raised at the Khartoum conference.

Indeed, there are some Israeli circles who are already gloating over this appearance by Husayn, regarding it as proof of the unfeasibility of an Israeli-Jordanian agreement on the future of the territories and as proof of the rejection of any kind of thought about a territorial compromise.

This "happiness" is, of course, intended to prove that in fact there is no alternative but to hold on to Judaea and Samaria in a sort of self-rule framework--a solution no Palestinian would accept.

King Husayn's announcement should be regarded against the background of the overall situation in our region. We know that President al-Sadat arrived in Jerusalem without having previously announced the cancellation of the Khartoum "negatives." However, when his arrival became imminent, there was a discreet agreement by Begin to hand over all of the Sinai to Egypt. This must be borne in mind upon reacting to Husayn's current negative stand.

The stalemate in the autonomy talks (it appears that the talks will again be postponed because of Dr Ghali's "business") and the intransigent positions presented by the Begin government are not exactly "bait" for King Husayn which will prompt him to announce his joining the peace-making process begun with the Israeli-Egyptian agreement. One can therefore assume that this is not Husayn's final word and that the hints emanating from various sources regarding his readiness to play the role of a partner to the talks under different circumstances are indeed legitimate.

At any rate, there is no room for "exultation" over Husayn's rejection. Egypt's isolation alongside Israel's isolation does not strengthen the peace process; rather, it weakens it substantially. Both Israel and Egypt need an additional link that will join the peace circle with them. Jordan might, despite all, serve as such a link in the future and under conditions of a fair compromise between the parties.

CSO: 4805

'DAVAR': SHAMIR HINTS HE WANTS TO REMAIN FOREIGN MINISTER

TA081333 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 8 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by DAVAR political correspondent Daniyel Bloch]

[Text] Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir has recently used several occasions to express his preference for the post of foreign minister. He would rather continue in his current office until the end of this cabinet's term and not be transferred to the Defense Ministry.

It appears that Shamir has also given up hope of getting a Knesset majority to approve the cabinet reshuffle. That is why he has been active in the Foreign Ministry, assuming that he would continue to serve as foreign minister. According to Foreign Ministry people, Shamir likes his job and feels that it is potentially a vast arena for activity, particularly in the realm of relations with Europe and the development of ties with Asia and African countries in informal areas.

According to Foreign Ministry personnel, additional proof of this is Shamir's intention to appoint David Qimhi as director general of the Foreign Ministry instead of Yosef Ciechanover who will be resigning soon. The appointment of Qimhi should be regarded against the background of the personal ties established between the two men in the course of their working together in the security services. David Qimhi is not a Likud member. In the past he was associated with Mapai and Rafi personalities. It is highly unlikely that a minister on the verge of resigning would have appointed a new director general. Shamir could have been satisfied with the appointment of an acting director general had he estimated that he would resign from the Foreign Ministry in the near future.

Meanwhile, various political elements have stepped up their activity aimed at manning the defense portfolio. There is also increased demand for the appointment of a full-time defense minister among members of the defense establishment. Defense matters cannot be conducted in the course of a hasty visit by Acting Prime Minister Yigal Yadin to the Defense Ministry on Friday, from where he proceeded to a reception on the occasion of the U.S. Independence Day and then continued to his summer residence in Mikhmoret.

PP EFS

FIJI AMBASSADOR--The new Fijian ambassador to Israel, Mr Joseph David Gibson, presented his credentials to President Yitzhaq Navon today at the presidential residence. Since 1976 Gibson has served as the Fiji ambassador to the Court of St James and he has now been accredited as nonresident ambassador to Israel as well. [TA270919 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1412 GMT 26 Jun 80]

COMMITTEE GOES UNDERGROUND--The members of the National Guidance Committee in the territories are now preparing for the resumption of their activities in underground conditions. The committee had ended its activities after the deportation of the Hebron and Halhul mayors and the attempts to assassinate the mayors of Nabulus and Ramallah. The military government is aware of this move and intends to take measures to limit the activity of the committee members. The intention is to confine the committee members to their places of residence as well as to prevent them from establishing personal contacts among themselves. [Text] [TA081215 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Jul 80 p 1]

SHAY REVERTS TO OLD NAME--The Change and Initiative (Shay) Movement Council has decided to revert to its original name--Shinuy [change]--and to add to it the words: "Central Party." [mifleget merkas] In fact, this was the name the members of "Shinuy" had originally wanted to use when the Democratic Movement for Change [DMC] split up about 1 and 1/2 years ago. However, this met with the opposition of MK's Me'ir 'Amit and David Golomb, who have in the meantime withdrawn from the movement, returning to the alignment. [Avi Bettelheim] [Text] [TA081252 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Jul 80 p 3]

PAVING OF NEW ROAD--Contrary to the opinion of the government legal adviser a new road will soon be paved to the Elon More settlement on Jabal al-Kabir. Some sections of this road will pass through cultivated private lands. Our political correspondent Shim'on Schiffer has learned that the government legal adviser, Prof Yitzhaq Zamir, submitted to the prime minister a detailed opinion against the paving of the road which will require the expropriation of cultivated private lands. In contrast Minister Ari'el Sharon claimed that the road to the settlement will also serve the residents of the village

of Dayr al-Hatab and benefit the entire region. This issue was submitted to the decision of a ministerial team headed by Acting Prime Minister Yigal Yadin and the team decided that the issue is subject to the defense minister's decision. The defense establishment supported the proposal and work on paving the new road to the Elon More settlement will start soon.
[Text] [TA091525 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 9 Jul 80]

UNEMPLOYMENT DATA--The picture of employment in the Israeli economy is not as clear-cut as presented by the Finance Ministry yesterday. The employment service possesses data indicating that the number of unemployed in the first quarter of this year was 20,500 rather than 57,000 as published by the Finance Ministry yesterday. The head of the employment service, Mr Barukh Haqlay, explained to our correspondent that the disparity between the two figures is a result of two different systems of calculation. The employment service admits that the employment situation has deteriorated indeed but it is less grave than the picture depicted by the Finance Ministry which relied on the data of the Central Bureau of Statistics. [Text] [TA091945 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 9 Jul 80]

CAPITAL DRAIN TO U.S.--Israeli capital worth close to \$100 million was invested in the United States in 1979. This process is still continuing, both through investments in U.S. bonds and shares and by emigrants who take money with them. It appears that more and more Israelis emigrating to the United States bring with them capital worth between \$100,000 to \$150,000 and this enables them to either purchase a small business or enter into a partnership. The number of relatively well to do Israelis leaving the country has recently grown and the overall capital taken out of the country either directly or indirectly by those emigrants reaches approximately \$30 million. Another method of draining Israel of capital is employed by Israel banks which last year purchased U.S. shares worth at least \$68 million. There is even more Israeli money invested through manipulation of U.S. shares. It, too, amounts to several million dollars. Israeli investments in property such as apartment buildings, office buildings and hotels reaches several million dollars. Such transactions are carried out despite restrictions by the director of the foreign exchange department of the Bank of Israel.
[Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Jul 80 p 1]

STEEL DEAL WITH EGYPT--Recently 20,000 tons of steel were sold to Egypt at \$305 a ton. This is the largest business transaction that has to date been signed between Israel and Egypt. The transaction was carried out through a foreign agent. The steel was loaded on a ship at the port of Haifa and the ship sailed directly to its Egyptian destination. Yet, even though this is a large transaction, the steel was sold at prices about 20 percent lower than world market prices. This is probably due to the fact that the steel industry lacks markets and wanted to get rid of the surpluses that piled up in its warehouses. [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Jul 80 p 12]

EGYPT-ISRAEL BOOK SERIES--"Peace between Israel and Egypt is gaining strength daily. No one has the right to interfere in what is happening now and in

what will happen in the future," President Anwar al-Sadat wrote in a special preface to a new "Israel and Egypt" book series, currently being published by an Israeli publishing house. This series is the first literary coproduction of journalists, scholars and experts from Israel and Egypt. In the preface President al-Sadat writes that he is thanking God for what happened ever since he came to Israel. "Everything is happening as we agreed. By peaceful means we have attained the goals we could not reach by war," President al-Sadat concludes his preface, saying that our sons and grandchildren will live a calmer life than that of their fathers. [TA270645 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1430 GMT 27 Jun 80]

PURCHASES FROM EASTERN BLOC--Yesterday the directorate of the Israel Electricity Corporation decided to purchase power cables for 80 million Israeli pounds from manufacturers in Eastern Europe. An offer by Israeli manufacturers to supply the goods for 150 million Israeli pounds was turned down because it would have been more expensive than the other offers received. [TA270645 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 27 Jun 80 p 14]

EXPORTS TO FRG--West Germany is receiving 35 percent of the Israeli exports and is the second largest importer of Israeli products after the United States, the director of the Foreign Economy Department in the German Federal Economics Ministry said, in a symposium at the Israel-Germany Commerce and Industry Chamber. Germany influences the Israeli economy more than other countries whose population is larger, the director added. Deputy director general of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism Dr Ya'akov Kohen said that with the exception of diamond exports, the Federal Republic of Germany is as large an importer of Israeli goods as the United States. [TA270645 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 27 Jun 80 p 4]

AIRCRAFT SALES--Israel aircraft industries signed an agreement with the Colombian Government about 6 months ago, through which IAI sold Colombia three 'Arava aircraft. The last was supplied a few days ago. IAI has also sold 12 such planes to Mexico. [TA301238 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jun 80 p 6]

IDF EXTENDED SERVICE--Soldiers about to finish their military service who find it difficult to find a job in the civilian market will be given the option to serve an additional term, of up to 2 months, under regular service conditions. This was announced by the IDF spokesman. This option will primarily be given to soldiers without professional training. Their extended service depends on the approval of the general adjutancy. The IDF spokesman notes that a soldier whose extended service is approved will remain in his unit and will continue to discharge the same duties or any other duties imposed on him in the same unit. [TA020537 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1715 GMT 30 Jun 80]

VOICE OF HOPE--On the occasion of its fourth anniversary, network "C" [531 KHZ] will adopt the radio station "The Voice of Hope" of free Lebanon

on Thursday, 3 July at 1000. The idea of fraternity and friendship between the two peoples and cooperation between the two radio stations will be emphasized in a special broadcast. Two mobile broadcasting units will be stationed in southern Lebanon on Wednesday. One of the units will be stationed on Mount Odeh on the Golan Heights. [TA020537 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1945 GMT 1 Jul 80]

UNEMPLOYMENT UP--In the first quarter of the year the number of unemployed totalled 57,000 persons, or 4.4 percent of the labor force. The number of unemployed in the comparable period last year was 35,000, or 2.8 percent of the labor force. This was stated yesterday by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The civilian labor force increased by 23 percent last year and now stands at 1,295,500 persons. There was a 5.5 percent increase last year in the number of persons employed in the public services and an 8 percent increase in the number of those employed in the financial branches. The number of persons employed in industry and in agriculture declined by 1.3 and 3 percent respectively. There was a decrease of 6 percent in the number of persons employed in construction. [TA020537 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Jul 80 p 11]

MONEY PRINTED IN JUNE--The Bank of Israel printed approximately 5.15 billion Israeli pounds in June. Our correspondent Gid'on Zelinger notes that this is a relatively small sum. This stems from the increased sale of government bonds to the public and institutions. [The increase] in last month's printing was caused by the rise in the repayment of debts and the credit given to manufacturers and people getting easy terms for housing. [Text] [TA020537 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 1 Jul 80]

JUNE UNEMPLOYMENT DATA--Data published by the employment service for June indicates a worsening of the unemployment situation compared with May. The number of job seekers in June was more than 33,000. This indicates an increase of 1,100 in the number of unemployed persons compared with May. Among the unemployed, there are 10,000 people who have been without a job for more than 6 days, an increase in this category. Most of the unemployed receive unemployment allowances. [TA062106 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 4 Jul 80]

GAZA RURAL COUNCIL--Gaza, 6 Jul--Last weekend, the military commander of the Gaza Strip and Sinai, Brig Gen Yitzhaq Segev, appointed Musa Tawfiq Hamid as head of the Bayt Hanun rural council in the northern Gaza Strip. Segev also appointed eight Bayt Hanun residents as members of the rural council. The previous head of the Bayt Hanun council, Mahmud (Za'anun), resigned from his post together with the mayors of Gaza and Bethlehem to protest the assassination attempts against the mayors of Nabulus and Ramallah. Mahmud (Za'anun's) two colleagues retracted their resignation. The military commander accepted (Za'anun's) resignation and appointed another person to replace him. [Text] [TA062106 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1820 GMT 6 Jul 80]

INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS UP--Last month industrial exports, excluding diamonds, rose by 30 percent. The first 6 months of this year saw a nominal rise in

exports of 32 percent, which constitutes a real growth of 12 percent. This is reported by our correspondent Yosi Melman. [TA070620 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 7 Jul 80]

EMIGRATION VINDICATED BY SOME--About 25 percent of the total adult population in Israel find emigration from Israel justified. This emerges from a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ. In reply to the question: "The newspapers occasionally publish reports about people who wish to leave Israel. Do you find the emigrants justified or condemn them?" 23.4 percent replied that they found the emigrants justified, as compared to 56.8 percent who did not justify emigration. Another 10.4 percent said that their stance is determined by the circumstances pertaining to each case. The remaining 9.4 percent did not have any opinion on the issue. Pori Director Rafa'el Gil, who conducted the poll, notes that among those who justify emigration there is a considerable proportion of youths from 18-29, of whom 36.1 percent find the emigrants justified. Other groups that are notable in this respect are people whose country of origin is Asia or Africa (32.1 percent) and manual workers (31.4 percent). A decisive majority, 68.1 percent of the total population, object to granting special benefits to emigrants who wish to return to Israel, 20.4 percent support granting benefits and 5.1 percent said they favored benefits only in special cases, such as if the recipients of benefits pledge they will not leave the country again, considering the number of years the emigrant remained abroad, whether the benefits will be accorded solely to the emigrants' children and also depending on the scope of the benefits. The remaining 6.4 percent had no opinion on the subject. The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 men and women, aged 18 and older, who were interviewed in their homes. [Text] [TA081454 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Jul 80 p 3]

CSO: 4805

SECURITY, EFFECTIVENESS OF U.N. SECURITY FORCES DEBATED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 May 80 p 11

[Article: "U.N. Forces Suffer 41 Casualties So Far in South Lebanon; Dublin Conference: Our Hearts Are with Lebanon, and Lebanon's Heart Is with Our Casualties"]

[Text] Last week Lebanon and its problems, and especially the problems of South Lebanon and the conditions of the U.N. security forces there, were the subject of inquiry and investigation at a conference for 11 ministers of foreign affairs, ambassadors and senior officials in the countries that are taking part in the U.N. peace-keeping force. The conference was held in the northern part of the globe which is thousands of kilometers away from Lebanon. The worries of Lebanon and the world's worries with Lebanon had a date in Dublin, the capital of the people of Southern Ireland, a small nation whose people are well-known for their fortitude, their courage and their tenacity. After the al-Tabari incident those Irish forgot their numerous problems and their struggles with Britain over the fish and the oil of the North Sea, and they forgot the massacres that were taking place in the northern half of their nation which is oppressing, bleeding and hurting Britain daily with its casualties and its wounded, and they only remembered the problem of South Lebanon. They remembered the combat militias of Haddad and Israel and the contentiousness of Israel in South Lebanon where five young men from the U.N. peace-keeping force were killed.

U.N. Assistant Secretary General Brian Urquhart attended the conference to consider the methods of implementing U.N. Security Council resolutions on South Lebanon and the role that the U.N. forces would play towards that end without being subjected to the dangers of bloody confrontations. Mr Urquhart justified the statement that was made after the al-Tabari incident by the President of the Security Council, Mr Mendez. In that statement the representative from Mexico had described the incident as a deliberate, pre-meditated crime. These were expressions that were being used for the first time in the history of the Security Council. Mr Urquhart explained [that the statement was justified] because the council considered the murder of U.N. soldiers in al-Tabari to have been

perpetrated against peaceful, unarmed soldiers and not in the course of a battle or an exchange of fire. The Security Council followed the statement that was issued by its president with a resolution in which it emphasized its reference to what was included in the former Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. In one part the resolution stated that the peace-keeping force did not use weapons except in self defense. In the second part the resolution stated that the peace-keeping force can defend itself and can use weapons if these forces are prevented by force from carrying out their mission.

It is evident from what has already been stated that the Security Council left the interpretation of the use of force to the countries that are participating in the peace-keeping forces. It was from this premise that the idea to convene a conference in Dublin emerged, especially since the incidents where the soldiers with the blue hats were attacked have recurred, and the number of casualties they suffered since these forces assumed their responsibilities in March 1978 has risen to 41. This figure does not include the wounded, the disabled and the maimed. Furthermore, the 16th of June which is the time for the Security Council to consider the resolution to renew [the mandate] of these forces is almost upon us.

It was to Dublin, which is furious over its citizens who have been killed and which is openly angry with Israel and with Haddad and enthusiastically supportive of the Palestinians, that the representatives of the countries of the U.N. forces came. They brought with them [reports about] the suffering of their soldiers in South Lebanon and their problems and complaints. Everybody came, and the only one that was absent was the representative of Lebanon. Lebanon's minister of foreign affairs did not come and did not send his ambassador in London who also represents his country in Ireland. He did not even send a junior officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The absence of Lebanon from the conference was not the only thing for which the conferees blamed the Lebanese government. They accused it openly during their conference of using the presence of their forces in Lebanon in the tactics of its internal political game. The government would announce through its minister of foreign affairs and then through the speaker of its Chamber of Deputies that it was displeased with the presence of the U.N. forces and that it was asking them to withdraw since their presence in Lebanon was useless. The government did that even though its real position on that matter was quite the opposite. The evidence for this is that Prime Minister al-Huss had made a statement denying that the government had called for the departure of the U.N. forces. He made that statement after a U.N. delegation visited him and after he found out that four ambassadors of countries that are participating in the blue forces had visited Samir Sanbar, the official U.N. spokesman in Beirut. They had told him that they were displeased with the attacks that were being made against them by official Lebanese authorities. They said that

they were actually thinking about withdrawing if this was the Lebanese posture towards them. But when the situation was explained to them and they were told that the Lebanese government had utilized their presence to take advantage of it in its local political squabbles, they replied, "We are sacrificing our own people, and we are being subjected to numerous pressures from our peoples, and from the U.N. Secretariat General, which is blaming us for the position of our soldiers and wondering that if we cannot at least implement the Security Council Resolution in full by imposing our control and the control of the Lebanese government on all of South Lebanon, we should at least stay in our positions and not leave them to Israel or to the status quo forces--this is the name that the United Nations uses to refer to Sa'd Haddad's forces. Of course, occasionally there is also political pressure on us from the Arab countries and from Israel and the United States at other times. In addition, there are also the pressures of the events themselves and the provocations against us which these events generate. Is not all this enough for us, and now you, the Lebanese, are adding to our problems? You did not help us in our mission, whereas our mission, according to Security Council Resolution, consists of helping you establish and not impose your sovereignty over your lands. We are not asking you under your present circumstances, which we know very little about, to help us, but you can at least give us political and media support. We are fighting with you on the same side, and this is how we should deal with each other. The whole world is working for you and you are doing nothing for yourselves. We understand why you were not able to carry out your decision to send your army into the South, but we do not understand why you did not honor our soldiers who died on your borders; we do not understand why you refused to permit a memorial service to be held for one of those who were killed unless it were held at the VIP hall in the airport and after numerous interventions on our part. We also do not understand why you did not take advantage of Israel's attack on you and sometimes on us through its allies, the forces of Haddad, to show it off in front of the United Nations and the whole world, even though you know that Israel does fear the United Nations and pretends to respect it because it was itself the product of a U.N. resolution."

These statements were repeated by the conferees during the Dublin Conference after the conferees decided to change the conference from a conference for defense ministers to one for ministers of foreign affairs on the basis of the fact that its resolutions will be political and the military part of those resolutions would not be implemented by a political decision. The conferees also made many other statements, especially about the recent events that took place in the Lebanese border villages. They all concurred about a single account of the al-Tabari incident, which was tantamount to the straw that broke the camel's back, since the eyewitnesses were citizens of the various countries that participate in the U.N. forces.

In this climate that was charged with tension against Sa'd Haddad and Israel and which was blaming Lebanon and the Security Council for the pressures that were being exerted on them and on their peoples, the ministers of foreign affairs of the countries that are participating in the U.N. forces met to decide upon sending delegations to Lebanon, Israel and the United States. These delegations would hold intense talks whose purpose was to help these forces carry out their missions. What is being requested from the United States is the same request that was made in the letter which the president of Ireland sent recently to President Carter. He urged President Carter to exert pressure on Israel to limit its aid to Sa'd Haddad and his militias and to stop its repeated attacks on South Lebanon because this embarrasses the peace-keeping force. The objective of the delegation's visit to Israel is the same as that of the delegation which is visiting the United States.

But in Lebanon the delegation will ask Lebanese officials for coordination, assistance and expedition in sending the army to the borders and removing the U.N. forces from the Lebanese game. The delegation will ask Lebanese officials to take advantage of the anger that exists internationally against Israel because of its support for Sa'd Haddad so that the request that the joint truce agreement be respected can be emphasized. This is the agreement that Lebanon adheres to and Israel is apprehensive of. But Israel cannot reject the treaty because it respects international agreements, and especially in this situation when Israel is being subjected to a strong campaign against it because it is not helping the U.N. forces carry out their mission.

Another delegation will negotiate all these matters with Secretary General Waldheim and will ask him for more Security Council efforts to facilitate the missions of the U.N. forces. These forces are taking over conditions on the borders as though these conditions were a patient in serious condition, who underwent surgery to save his life but suffered a serious relapse while recuperating. The delegation wants the Security Council and the superpowers to take care of this patient while he is recuperating and to watch over him until he recovers completely.

After the results of the missions of these delegations [are determined], the conference will re-convene in Norway, either with the ministers of defense or with the military commanders. The conference will re-convene to make a decision about supplying the U.N. forces with offensive weapons so they can ward off any attempt to attack them.

This does not mean that the U.N. forces will be turned from a peace-keeping force to a deterrent force because deterrence is a function of national armies, and the function of the U.N. forces is only to assist in guaranteeing the function of these areas.

The conference may also re-convene with the ministers of foreign affairs to decide perhaps the withdrawal of the [member] countries from the U.N. forces or to express appreciation for the diplomatic and political efforts that were made by all parties to assist in ensuring that the United Nations carry out its missions in South Lebanon.

8592

CSO: 4802

CHAIRMAN OF AMAL MOVEMENT AFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR UNIFIED LEBANON

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 May 80 pp 12-13

[Interview with Nabih Bari, Chairman of Amal Movement by Farid al-Khatib; Chairman of Amal Movement Tells AL-HAWADITH: "Our Agreement with Patah Precludes Settlement of People; We Support Action of Spreading Out the Army in All South Lebanon Even Before Beirut and Its Suburbs; Shi'ites Cannot Be Sent Back to Bottom Rung of Hierarchy of Sects in Lebanon"]

[Text] Between the time we asked for an appointment with attorney Nabih Bari and his response an hour later last Friday evening, Imam Hasan al-Shirazi, president of the Association of Shi'ite Scholars in Lebanon and brother of Imam Muhammad al-Shirazi of Iran was killed. He had arrived in Lebanon on the eve of [the anniversary of] "the Two Years' War". He had received the support of the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Kamil al-As'ad, and he had also been nominated to succeed Imam Musa al-Sadr, chairman of the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council, who has disappeared.

Attorney Bari is the neighbor of AL-HAWADITH on Corniche al-Mazra'ah [Beirut suburb]. But the house in which he resides looks like it is almost vacant. The furniture of one of the living rooms and of the dining room are gathered [in a corner], while the lady of the house is residing abroad. Bari offered us some Nescafe, but we did not think it was necessary since he is a "bachelor" at the present time.

In front of a picture of Imam al-Sadr, with the telephone ringing about once every 10 minutes, and after an interruption for a brief interview in both Arabic and English with BBC television, we had a comprehensive interview with Nabih Bari. The interview lasted over 3 hours, and his aides sat in on part of it. Mr. Bari offered us some mineral water. I heard the sound of machine gun fire in the background.

[Question] It has been mentioned that the change which came over the leadership of the Amal Movement was dictated by an act of self-criticism by the former leadership. What is the truth?

[Answer] After the disappearance of His Eminence Imam Musa al-Sadr, emergency by-laws were added to the movement's basic by-laws. These emergency by-laws established a secretariat general which is headed now by the secretary general. [This position] was not in the original by-laws. These emergency by-laws were tied to an interim period that would not exceed 1 year and would end on 3 April 1980.

When it came time to conduct business, some confusion developed due to the overlapping of provisions of the basic by-laws and those of the emergency by-laws. But this flaw did not involve the leaders as persons. When the movement saw before the appointed time that there was no point in maintaining this confusion which may affect the leaders and the rank and file, it called for a general convention on 4 April, so it could take the appropriate action in the light of explanations by the preparatory committee of the convention. As a result of these presentations a decision was made to revoke the emergency by-laws and to restore the movement to its original sources, that is, to the by-laws. This required that a political leadership be elected and that responsibilities be distributed among the members of the leadership council in a manner that would place the executive authority and the decision making authority within one agency which would ensure the proper conduct of business and a unity of vision and posture.

[Question] Was the change in the leadership of the movement a process of moving from individual leadership to collective leadership?

[Answer] The leadership of the Amal Movement was built and established on a democratic basis from the outset. God ordered the leaders to conduct [our] affairs by mutual consent [Counsel: 38]. Consequently, one person alone cannot bear the responsibility for leadership, because the distribution of responsibilities according to the movement's by-laws is pyramid-like. No leadership can set itself up according to these by-laws unless its decisions are inspired by the infrastructure and in a sequential manner.

As we indicated the emergency by-laws that were established are based on the same old foundations. But the fact that there was confusion on a mandatory power in so far as its being under the jurisdiction of the Political Bureau or that of the Board of Trustees made some decisions, which were in fact struggles over jurisdictions, appear to be unilateral. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the new leadership came as a response to an alleged unilateral action because it was in fact a return to origins.

[Question] The secretary general of the movement Mr Husayn al-Husayni left his position because of the extreme difficulties that he faced in assuming his duties in the midst of the difficult circumstances in the country. How did you accept [the prospect of] assuming the same position?

[Answer] First, I do not believe that the brother Mr Husayn al-Husayni left the responsibility of the secretariat general in the movement because of the momentousness and the seriousness of the situation.

Second, my brothers honored me at the general convention of the movement by giving me this charge because they believed that I could fulfill it. The fact is that I sense the momentous responsibility, and I hope that G-d will help me achieve what we all hope to achieve in the service of our homeland; to stop our country from being exploited and to help it by lighting at least one candle [to brighten] its long night.

I am not afraid because I feel that my duty and my responsibilities leave me no room for fear. Anyone who works for the public welfare is not allowed to have personal feelings, even if those feelings affect his being and his existence.

[Question] Does your election as head of the Command Council of the Amal Movement make you automatically a member of the Supreme Shi'ite Council?

[Answer] The fact that I am chairman of the Command Council does not give me the right to become a member of the Supreme Shi'ite Council. The Shi'ite Council is an independent organization; it has its own staff and administration, and these are different from those of the movement, which is a political movement.

[Question] Attempts are being made to divide the Amal Movement, especially amidst the furor of the Lebanese War which is causing fragmentation [in the country]. How are you preserving the unity of this movement?

[Answer] I have no information on this subject. However, the Amal Movement is impervious to such attempts. A corrective movement cannot possibly occur in it because [our movement] is a movement and not a party. It is always taking action to correct its course, and as long as matters are taken care of by consultation from the infrastructure to the top, all these statements that are being made are [no more] than desperate attempts to raise doubts about the strength of the organization. I would advise those who are casting doubts [about the Amal Movement] to change their outlook and to try to cooperate with the movement for the sake of the homeland and the common goals instead of floundering in the darkness of their imaginations.

[Question] There is some information that the area of al-Janah may become a battlefield between Amal and the organizations that are thought to be affiliated with Iraq. What is your position on that?

[Answer] The leadership of the Amal Movement has no intention whatsoever of waging any battle, not in al-Janah where Lebanese establishments which are the pride of the Lebanese economy are located, nor elsewhere.

We are advocates of stability. We are struggling in a democratic manner, if the climate makes it possible, to achieve our demands in the interests of the oppressed and the deprived. We are not calling for the occupation of arenas because all the arenas are ours. We are the Lebanese people; we are not the foreigners. A person does not occupy his home.

[Question] Some observers consider Beirut to be the second capital for the Shi'ites in the world at the present time after Tehran. Do you see Beirut in this manner?

[Answer] I do not claim to speak for the Shi'ite sect, but I do shoulder my responsibilities as chairman of the Amal Movement whose orientation is not sectarian in nature; in fact, Amal is against sectarianism and factionalism. As far as I know the Shi'ites have not been judged historically by a sectarian standard. They constitute a permanent movement which seeks to return to the true origins of Islam in search of justice and equality in the context of one environment and one homeland. Ever since they came into being the Shi'ites have always been advocates of equality. A Shi'ite is legally required to fight a tyrannical ruler even if that ruler were Shi'ite. This is what happened in Iran, and the revolution in Iran was victorious, and suddenly we found out that it was an Islamic Revolution and not a Shi'ite Revolution.

On the Lebanese scene in particular we find that the Shi'ites are widespread in all the parties. In fact, they incurred most of the human losses either in the belt of misery--formerly around Beirut--or among the fighters. This is because they are advocates of freedom and are not seeking control of the country.

On the administrative level you know that the Shi'ite sect has been suffering from a chronic denial of positions and administrative [functions] on all levels. I have never heard them ask for more than justice.

[Question] It seems though that attempts to drive a wedge between the Amal Movement and the PLO, in addition to weakening the organization, are seeking to bring back the Shi'ite sect to the last rung of the sectarian hierarchy in Lebanon.

[Answer] I do not think so at all because history does not go back. Henceforth, the state cannot ignore the Shi'ites who suffered the bitterness of war and who sacrificed for Lebanon what they hold dear and what

they do not hold dear. It is the duty of the state to see where the explosive areas are and to try to eliminate the reasons for such explosions. But for the state to bury its head in the sand and to leave the majority of the Lebanese people experiencing the bitterness of deprivation, forced migration and indigence without immediately coming up with a remedy is a matter that will undoubtedly lead to popular outbreaks. These outbreaks will not be confined to the Shi'ites, but they will also include bigger classes of the Lebanese people which have come to share the same deprivation with the Shi'ites as a result of the war and have, consequently, adopted the same outlook and view.

[Question] What is your opinion about the recent Iranian statements that were made by Ayatollah Sadiq Khalakhali that Libya was not responsible for the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr?

[Answer] All Iranian officials have affirmed the opposite of what your question implies. Specifically, al-Shaykh Sadiq Khalakhali came to us with his prediction, and we responded to him at that time. On the same day Dr Sadeq Qotbzadeh, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs issued three statements which affirmed that Khalakhali was expressing his personal opinion, that he had made a personal visit to Libya and to Lebanon, and that he did not in any way represent the official point of view of Iran. Furthermore, the embassy of Iran in Beirut and the Organization of Iranian Students also openly announced the same position.

[Question] What do you think about the statement that Ayatollah Khalakhali made regarding the fact that the purpose of not announcing the fate of Imam al-Sadr is to drive a wedge between Sunnis and Shi'ites on the one hand and between Shi'ites and Palestinians on the other?

[Answer] I do not know how he could allow his imagination to wander like this. It has been 1 year and 10 months since His Eminence Imam Musa al-Sadr disappeared, and what Sadiq Khalakhali had predicted and announced did not materialize. This view is just like the wisdom he expressed on the question of Imam Musa al-Sadr: it is not based on any facts; it is impossible to achieve; and it is rejected in sum and in its parts.

[Question] What specifically do you envision will be the position of the movement, first, on national reconciliations

[Answer] If the partitioning of Lebanon and the settlement of people cause significant damage to some, they would absolutely annihilate the Amal Movement. No group in Lebanon would be hurt by partition more than the deprived groups. Accordingly, we are saying it forcefully--that Lebanese reconciliation based on the foundations and the indisputable facts that were proposed by His Excellency President Sarkis and Prime Minister al-Huss is a vital and a fundamental demand. We are devoting all our capabilities to achieve this reconciliation as long as the unity of the land and of the people remains an inseparable part of these indisputable facts. The movement which took part in the reconciliation

talks--and I had the honor of representing the movement with the former secretary general--affirmed this view, and it affirmed its support of the state towards this goal. We also asked that the principles [of reconciliation] include some detailed matters such as developing a standard patriotic education book and a standard history of Lebanon to be taught to all our children so that a unified Lebanese generation can be created. This would place future Lebanon beyond the reach of sectarian pitfalls that appear as blind fanaticism.

[Question] Second, what is your position on sending the army to the field?

[Answer] Building a national and a capable army certainly serves the cause of non-partitioning, whereas building a sectarian army would make Lebanon a country of sects. History has taught us all that Prussia was united by Bismarck with one army; Prussia had consisted of 300 states. History also taught us that Garibaldi united a divided Italy with one army also. Lebanon would be under no danger, regardless of the storms that may blow over it, if it had one army for the homeland. It would be extremely dangerous for Lebanon if all its plains were [as beautiful as those of] Switzerland and it did not have an army like the Swiss army.

The movement supports sending the Lebanese army and spreading it out in the South, first in the small state of Sa'd Haddad and everywhere as far as Sidon. In making such a decision the movement is deliberately ignoring all the branches that make up the army. Why? Because the danger of this small state which was created and implanted by Israel, the danger of the forced migration of the residents of South Lebanon and the danger of emptying the land, with the foreknowledge that Israel has ambitious designs on the waters of the Litani River, have prevented us from becoming familiar with the current standards of building an army. We said that if the army were to be spread along the borders, and that would be its natural place, and if its blood were to be mixed with the soil of the homeland, it will naturally be considered patriotic, and the charges of sectarianism against it would be disproved. Accordingly, the homeland would be preserved because the army would be spread throughout the country, and this is what is most important.

But when [that] opinion was replaced by an attempt to send the army to the districts of Beirut and to Beirut because of conflict with the factions, the movement thought that approving such a measure would not be in the interests of the army first, because the army may be exhausted by a fight that would remove it from its basic objective which is to defend the borders of the homeland. The movement, therefore, took up an opposition posture here and a supportive posture there out of its concern for the army first and for the unity of Lebanon, second. We hope that the applied ordinances of the army law will be issued in a manner that would balance the army in the first stage, and we hope that the army will acquire its patriotism in a second stage through practice.

[Question] Third, what is your view of relations with the Palestinian Resistance and with the Fatah Movement in particular?

[Answer] When Amal first came into existence, Imam al-Sadr taught us that those who are deprived on their land provide support and backing for those who are deprived of their land [translator's emphasis]. He taught us that cooperation with Israel was sinful. The movement observed this position and put it into practice by verbal and practical example. It supported the Palestinian question, and it has always had special relations with Fatah in particular. [The fact is] that the resident of South Lebanon gave the Palestinian question more than any Arab gave it. If some people bore the brunt of the Palestinian question since 1967 or 1975, the resident of South Lebanon has borne it since 1948. I was a little boy when Israeli airplanes attacked my village of Tabanin in 1948 and wounded and killed some members of the village.

[Question] Fourth, what is your view of relations with Syria and, accordingly, the presence of Arab retaliatory forces and their role in Lebanon?

[Answer] Today, Syria may be the only arena of confrontation in this vast Arab area. Supporting it and standing beside it in its struggle against Israel and beyond Israel is a national duty. In all cases Lebanon has to keep its special relations and especially with its relative and its neighbor, Syria. Lebanon has to strengthen its relations with Syria in the best possible way. This would ultimately be in the interests of Lebanon, of Syria and in the interests of peace and the economy, especially in both countries. We may sometimes be able to forge history, but we can never forge geography.

[Question] Fifth, what do you think of Speak Kamil al-As'ad and the "princes" of the Shi'ites in Lebanon?

[Answer] The Amal Movement builds its relations with others on the basis of its proclaimed and well-known principles. Accordingly, determining our relations with any person, party or authority takes these principles into account first and foremost. The first one of these principles is not recognizing Shi'ite "princes." Hence, the Amal Movement has no relations with what is called Shi'ite "princes," because it was fashioned out of a model of deprivation and it works tirelessly for the interests of the oppressed and the destitute. The Amal Movement believes that the age of the "princes" in question, of the Shihabis and the provincial powers has gone for good.

[Question] What is your position on the fact that several Shi'ite villages have joined the border strip which is administered by Sa'd Haddad? Are you calling for the U.N. troops to come forward and to station themselves in these villages?

[Answer] None of the villages, Shi'ite, Christian or otherwise, has joined [Sa'd Haddad]. These villages were occupied, and most of their residents, from all sects, abandoned them so as not to come under the brunt of occupation. But what can those who cannot move do? Those people are helpless just like the residents of the West Bank and occupied Palestine are. You have noticed that invitations have been made by Sa'd Haddad to some mayors in the border villages to join him, or rather to meet with him. Their answer has always been in the negative, in spite of the fact that threats to bombard [villages] and to send [people] into long, hard exile are made and are carried out. Such a response is a clear indication of the patriotism of those citizens and of their insistence on their legal status and their independent state of Lebanon.

[Question] Facts are increasing the conviction that settling [all] the Palestinians or some of them in the South is unavoidable. However, the state has not yet made any move to delay such a project. How can you resist such a project before it turns into an existing fact?

[Answer] The settlement [policy] is one of the avenues for partitioning Lebanon; it is another project to scuttle the Palestinian question. It is the duty of the Palestinian citizen and of the Palestinian revolution, more so than that of the Lebanese citizen, to oppose this conspiracy because it would imply the termination of the Palestinian question and the justice it stands for. It is in fact an infernal idea to make up for the crime of usurping Palestine by committing another crime: that of usurping such a plan does not lie in having Amal and Fatah differ, for example, even if a Palestinian and a Lebanese may differ. Resistance to this plan rather requires Amal and Fatah to walk side by side and to resist this vile conspiracy [together]. If the conspirators felt that settlement can only be based on the dead bodies or the Lebanese and the Palestinian peoples, it is most certain that it will not happen.

As far as Amal in particular is concerned, let us say quite candidly: this settlement will not happen as long as there are babies in the wombs of our women and as long as we can walk on our roads.

[Question] Is it true that as long as Imam Khomeyni is supporting the Palestinian resistance, the opposition of the Shi'ite leaders to the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon will be of no use?

[Answer] With all due appreciation and respect for the leadership of Imam Khomeyni and his patriotic positions, we are saying that we have been assuming a posture of support for the Palestinian question years before the Iranian Revolution achieved victory, and we are still supporting the Palestinian question. We were, and we still are being inspired by his friend, Imam Musa al-Sadr to assume that position. Imam Khomeyni's position is identical to that of Imam Musa al-Sadr after each one of them drew from the same well of faith.

At the end of the meeting which lasted several hours, the chairman of Amal was exhausted, and his eyes were red. My colleague, Ghassan Barri, who had taken part in the interview, and I were also exhausted, especially from dealing with general matters amidst the cruel circumstances which Lebanon is experiencing. The AL-HAWADITH team left Bari's house and the guarded building in which he resides in the middle of the night. The team moved through the narrow alleys of the quarter where small barracks belonging to the various parties and organizations are scattered.

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COMMERCIAL ROLE OF SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM DEPLORED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 May 80 pp 45-46

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "Social Security Turns into Business Institution with Reserve of Three Quarters of a Billion Pounds; Rida Wahid Tells AL-HAWADITH That Social Security Is Indivisible Unless Lebanon Is Partitioned; End of Service Compensation Branch Fails; Health Insurance and Family Compensation Branches Threatened with Deficit"]

[Text] It is true that the war which has been ongoing in Lebanon for 5 years has produced several social problems, and it is true that some of these problems are quite serious as a result of the devastation, destruction, emigration, forced emigration, unemployment and declining production, not to mention security conditions which have forced changes in the demographic distribution of citizens. However, none of the experts, not even any one of the politicians, is denying that the social problems that were prevalent before 1975 are responsible for refueling the fires of war; these problems were tantamount to the fuel that assured the continuation of this war.

When the war began, the Lebanese economy was succumbing under the control of what is called four percent of the people who represent the capitalist class. Ten years had elapsed since the social security system was put into practice in Lebanon and since its sole institution had begun its operations on the 1st of May in 1965 to help workers and employees meet the burdens of their social requirements. Through its three branches, end of service compensation, family compensations and health and maternity benefits, it was able to offer insured persons social benefits such as monetary payments which came to about 430 million pounds by the end of 1974. This is compared with revenues that consist of premiums collected from employers and amounting to 858 million pounds. This means that the reserves which were on hand at that time amounted to 428 million pounds. Most of this sum was attributable to the end of service compensation branch.

There is no doubt that insured persons benefited from these funds, but the benefit they got was very meager, compared to the social problems that were draining their incomes extremely quickly.

What can a family compensation check do to an insured person who is entitled to it if he has five children and a wife when that check amounts to 60 or 75 pounds a month?

It is true that health and maternity benefits came to about 70 percent of the total health expenses of insured persons, but this ratio sometimes declined to less than 50 percent [of the total health costs] as a result of the fact that the employee became the victim of manipulation by interested physicians, hospitals and laboratories. The insurance program itself contributed to reducing the benefits of an insured person who has been complaining that employees delay and procrastinate in completing his business. This usually makes him incur transportation costs several times, and it also keeps him from working. According to one evaluation of the situation, health insurance solved part of the health problem, but it did not solve it all.

In addition, there are social problems that have been getting worse and wearing out the fabric of Lebanese society. The most important of these problems are those of housing and education. The latter problem has turned into a lucrative commercial enterprise that is quite remote from government interference. Its purpose is to have a specific educational plan in the context of the free education project in all the stages of education and to make elementary education mandatory.

In carrying out the stipulations of the financial system of regulations of the insurance program, insurance funds could have been invested in social projects that deal with the areas of housing, education and building hospitals and clinics. But the fund did not do this, and its investments were confined to bank deposits with guaranteed profits.

Thus, instead of channeling the funds into social investments to benefit the employees who had paid these funds, the funds were channeled to the capitalists through the banks so they could invest them to double their profits and to tighten even further the control that four percent [of the population] have over the various sectors of the Lebanese economy.

Who is responsible for this?

Dr Rida Wahid, the general manager of the Social Security Fund says, "We are all responsible." Then he explains, "Early in the seventies the fund wrote a letter to the government to inform it that it was necessary to draw up a social, economic plan to invest the growing insurance funds because an investment process had to be carried out according to an agreement with the state in the context of a clear social policy."

It seems that the absence of such a policy and as a result of the fact that politicians were preoccupied with other political problems, the state was not able at that time to remedy the social problems and to benefit from the insurance funds by investing them in projects that would have solved these problems.

We must make reference here to the fact that the insurance fund made several attempts to invest its monies in various housing projects that would help an insured person own his own home. But these attempts failed because they collided with some political positions and with the position of the state in particular. The insurance fund itself failed to own a building where it can house its departments, and it is still renting from others. Before the war the state had agreed to grant the insurance fund some loans to build clinics and to finance some hospital projects. But what became of the condition of the fund after the war?

The fact is that the insurance community declined noticeably as a result of the destruction of institutions, immigration abroad, and the fact that some firms were being evasive about providing information about their employees.

In 1975 the insurance community consisted of 34,000 firms which employed 225,000 employees; 110,000 of those employees were benefiting from the family compensations program. The total number of beneficiaries from all the branches of insurance, that is the employees and the members of their families, came to about 750,000. This figure constitutes 25 percent of the population of Lebanon.

Since Lebanon is a young country, that is, 55 percent of its population are under 25 years of age, the employment market in Lebanon is growing--according to some experts--at a rate of 10 percent. On the basis of this equation, and had not the war happened, the number of insured employees in Lebanon would have reached 350,000. This means that more than 100,000 employees are currently working in Lebanon and that the firms where they work have not told the insurance fund about them. The insurance fund cannot force those firms under current security conditions to comply with the law. There are approximately 100,000 employees who emigrated during the war and who are working abroad; most of them are working in the Arab oil countries.

To give a clearer picture of the situation, we must provide some details about the development of the three branches of insurance after the years of the war.

First, the family compensations branch: In 1975 the benefits that were paid amounted to approximately 60 million pounds, and it was estimated that 1979 benefits would amount to about 42 million pounds. These figures are based on the fact that compensation for an employee with a family that is made up of five children and a wife is 75 pounds. After this amount was recently increased to 240 pounds, it is expected, according to the estimates made by the fund, that the benefits which will be paid this year will exceed 146 million pounds. There will be 10 million pounds in administrative costs added to that sum, making the total 156 million pounds. If the number of beneficiaries were the same as it was in 1975, the benefits paid would have amounted to 220 million pounds.

For the first time family compensation constitutes a tangible subsidy for the family budget in Lebanon. It is equal to more than 25 percent of the minimum wage which amounts to 765 pounds per month. This is compared with 14 percent in the past when compensation was 75 pounds and the minimum wage was 525 pounds.

The premiums that were paid to the family compensation branch declined from 80 million pounds in 1975 to 43 million pounds in 1979. One notices that the rate of decline is not proportionate to the number of beneficiaries because the premiums are not being collected. This is a natural result of the unstable security conditions and of the fact that there have been no legal prosecutions in years.

Second, the health insurance branch: Despite a 40 percent decline in the insurance community, benefits rose from 40 million pounds in 1975 to 56 million pounds in 1979. The reason for that is due to the fact that medical compensations rose by about 70 percent because of inflation. Use of health services also increased, and this is a cultural matter that was experienced by all the countries which adopted a health insurance program similar to that of Lebanon, especially with regard to giving the patient the freedom to choose his physician. In addition, the war itself has created cases of disease.

The revenues of this branch declined from 82 million pounds in 1975 to 55 million in 1979.

One notes that the premiums paid last year were equal to the benefits. Thus, there were no savings. Since benefits are likely to increase because of the increases in the cost of living, the question that is being raised now is this: Has health insurance in Lebanon begun to follow the same course of health insurance programs in Europe which are suffering from a financial deficit that has been growing for several years?

Third, the end of service [compensation] branch: In 1957 the benefits of this branch amounted to about 20 million pounds that were paid as compensation for end of service. But it has been noticed that 90 percent of those who request that their compensations be liquidated do not meet the two basic conditions. These are: having 20 years of service or reaching the age of 60. [The premature settlement of these policies] is an indication of the fact that the employment market in Lebanon is not stable. The monthly rate of turnover is 4,000 or 50,000 cases per year. This is equal to about 20 percent of the total insurance in force in the insurance community. This is a high ratio, and it is tied to partial and circumstantial unemployment.

This phenomenon became prominent in a large and a broad way among the ranks of workers and employees after the 2 years of the war, 1975 and 1976. Those workers and employees were afraid [they might lose their compensations] because of the security conditions, and they rushed to submit applications to liquidate their compensations and to cash them in.

In order to stop this onslaught, to observe the social aspect [of the program] and to force the employee to accumulate his compensation until he meets one of the two aforementioned conditions, the insurance fund amended the end of service system of regulations. It prohibited the disbursement of compensation except in very limited cases among which are permanent immigration or moving from the status of a worker to that of employer. Emphasis was placed on providing documents to prove either one of these two cases. As a result the end of service compensations that were paid in 1975 amounted to 29 million pounds. Had not the insurance fund adopted these strict measures, this figure would have exceeded 100 million pounds.

But despite all this the end of service system remains a failure. It has not achieved its basic social objective of providing effective protection to old and disabled people. It failed for several reasons, the most important of which are the erosion and the fragmentation of the compensation sum itself because of monetary inflation. If the average median income in Lebanon is 1,000 pounds a month, compensation for an employee who spent 10 years of service would be about 20,000 pounds. This is a very small sum that would not enable its owner to ensure his expenses. For the employer who reaches 60 years of age, the 20,000 pounds or the 30,000 pounds would be enough for 2 years only. What would he do the rest of his life?

The same is true for the employee who spends 20 years in service. In addition, the compensation to which he is entitled is not suitable for investment purposes in some project that would guarantee him the required income because the sum is a small one.

It has been noted that the revenues of the end of service program, which come from the premiums paid by employers, declined from 85 million pounds in 1975 to 16 million pounds in 1979 because the insurance community has shrunk on the one hand and because of the security conditions which prevent the collection of premiums in a complete manner, on the other hand. But if one adds to the sum of premiums collected the total bank interest that is earned by the fund, one may increase the actual value of the revenues to about 90 million pounds. This is because the interest rates have risen; at present the interest rate is over 10 percent. The fund pays only about 22 percent of its revenues in benefits and it keeps the rest. This is not consistent with the social objective of the program because the ratio of savings exceeds 75 percent, whereas the law stipulates that the reserve [funds] must be around 15 percent. It may hence be said that the insurance program can very easily pay an employee his compensation in the amount of three months' salary for every year of service instead of one month's salary for every year of service as is the case now.

The outstanding feature of the financial condition of the insurance fund is the fact that despite the decline in the number of insured people, and the decline in the rate of premium collection because of security reasons, reserve funds and total funds at the end of last year exceeded 750 million pounds. This is an increase of over 75 percent of the monies of the fund in 1974. The principal reason for this increase is due to the bank interest to which the insurance fund is entitled on its deposits which make up most of the aforementioned sum. In addition, premiums have increased as a natural result of successive wage increases during past years. This is because premiums are proportionate [to wages] and are computed on the basis of wages. It may thus be said that after 15 years of operating an insurance program, the program has been like any other profit-making, business enterprise.

And here the major question emerges: Will the insurance program in the eighties turn into a social institution that effectively fights high prices and raises the standard of living?

Dr Rida Wahid, general manager of the insurance program has drawn up a plan to develop the three branches of insurance. At present he is studying with officials the measures that must be taken to put them into actual practice.

In the course of his discussion about the role of insurance in fighting high prices, Dr Rida Wahid says, "Dealing with the subject of high prices and the factors and indicators that are implied therein suggests two closely connected equations which must be turned into concrete facts through a comprehensive view. It is on the basis of such a view that the policy of the country on social economy is to be based. These equations are:

- "1. Equating wages or income with the standard of living; [and]
- "2. Establishing a balance between wages or direct income and social benefits.

"The second equation," adds the general manager of the insurance program, "even though it is an extension of the first, does by itself constitute the dimensions and the scope of the aforementioned policy which goes beyond the individual to the family and to society. This is the policy that emphasizes the principle of social responsibility so as to achieve a suitable standard of living in the context of all society.

"Hence it becomes evident that the applications of the principle of social responsibility have an important and a direct effect on the standard of living and basically on forming the ability of direct income to meet the burdens of livelihood and the standard of living that is being sought. It is from this premise that we are proposing the question of developing

the insurance funds that are in force by means of new, internal equations so that these funds can become effective tools in fighting [high prices] and raising the standard of living in a general way."

For the health and maternity insurance fund: guaranteeing treatment to all citizens and expanding the field of application to new groups of insured persons.

For the family compensation fund: by turning this fund into a social benefits fund that would ensure, besides family compensation, housing and educational and vocational training benefits so as to contribute to solving the problem of housing, to develop skills for production and to guide young people towards areas of employment so as to avoid all forms of unemployment.

For the end of service compensation fund: Several years ago a proposal was made to turn this fund into an old age, disability and death insurance program, practical and official terms. We are affirming the necessity of making the aforementioned change, not only from the point of view of the funds that such a change would provide for investments in social service, but also because the change would free the incomes of workers from supporting groups for which this income is now assuming responsibility. These are the groups of people that have reached an advanced age and have found that the end of service compensations were adequate for only a short period of time. This support is not noticeable as a factor and an indicator of high prices. This support must be the responsibility of the society which is indebted for its constant progress and growth to the efforts of successive generations in production.

Financial and actuarial studies have shown that the funds which can be invested in social service by changing the branch are estimated to be in the tens of millions. These funds can be invested for 10 years without any risk so as to help citizens in the area of housing. In addition, the new system will carry out all its direct obligations towards those who are insured who deserve coverage in the aforementioned period.

In addition, negotiations are now underway between the insurance fund and the Council for Development and Reconstruction so as to coordinate and plan the role that is to be played by insurance funds in financing the implementation of some reconstruction projects in Lebanon, and especially in the social field.

Reference to an important question remains to be made. This is that several financially prosperous companies and employers are refraining from paying the insurance premiums for their employees because they fear that disturbances in security or political developments may occur that would create certain geographical changes or divisions and would cause those employees to lose their compensations.

Dr Wahid tells this group of employers, "This is a matter of trust. And here we must commend the personnel and the owners of institutions of all the different social and political trends because of their confidence in the insurance fund. We must therefore affirm that regardless of the future outlook for Lebanon, the fund will remain as it is. It will continue to work as it is doing now within a system whose implementation we have begun. This is a non-restrictive system. It will remain a single indivisible institution unless Lebanon itself is divided into two republics. But regardless of the possibilities, today in Switzerland where a federation is in effect, the insurance fund is a central fund, and it is becoming more and more centralized."

The statement by the general manager of the insurance program may reassure workers, but most employers will not respond by making an initiative to pay their debts to the insurance [program] which amount to about 300 million pounds because they are benefiting from the bank interests which are very high. They are certain that the state will issue a general amnesty for delinquent payments, even if that comes after some time.

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PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 May 80 p 14

[Article by Amin al-Siba'i: "No Reconciliation Without a Government, and No Government Before Reconciliation; 'National Coalition' Government Is Down the Road; Rashid Karami Is Most Likely Candidate"]

[Text] President Ilyas Sarkis seems to be more persistent than he has been any time in the past about renewing the attempt to replace the present government with a national coalition government that would achieve reconciliation.

While presidential palace circles were affirming that president Sarkis was satisfied with the idea and while they were talking about preliminary communications that were being made to overcome the obstacles to that project and about the fact that these communications included Syria, through minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, some of the ministers, on the other hand, were talking about some link between the conditions surrounding the general parliamentary discussion and the growing satisfaction with making a cabinet change.

Parliamentary sources relate that when minister Khaddam visited the palace 2 weeks ago, he invited the president to form a national coalition government. [He made that remark] with his back turned to Prime Minister Salim al-Huss who was present at the meeting.

This information could have remained confined within the context of the normal effort that for some time has been made and is still being made to change the government, had it not been for the fact that new details emerged on the political scene. Some of these details aroused attention because of their implications and their significance.

According to some of this information, the president had disclosed to Walid Jumblatt and to some of the members of the Socialist Party--this was before minister Khaddam's arrival in Beirut--his desire to renew the attempt to form a national coalition government. [He wanted] to make an effort to overcome the obstacles that prevent the parties to the national coalition from reaching an agreement on an action program, and he asked Mr Jumblatt to take part in overcoming these difficulties. He

asked him to take part in investigating the details of putting this idea into practice so that the effort made in this direction would not fail. In return, other efforts would be made in a similar mission on the Lebanese Front, and the efforts that have already been made to clear the air between Syria and the Phalangist Party would be taken into consideration.

As usual there was conflicting information about how far the idea of a cabinet change had gone. Deputies from the western district of Beirut said that the investigation into forming a national coalition government had shifted from generalities to specifics last week, and that several formulas had been proposed so that one could be selected. There were several attempts to probe the nature of the obstacles that would prevent charging a politician like former prime minister Rashid Karami with the task of heading the government, notwithstanding the differences that had alienated him from some of the leaders of the Lebanese Front. The notion of bringing in the fighters themselves to participate in such a government was also proposed so that ideological and political figures such as Ibrahim Qulaylat may be brought in from the western district. Figures from the eastern district, such as Bashir al-Jumayyil, in particular, or Danny or Duri Sham'un, would also be brought in along with other fighters and politicians who would be selected by the Lebanese Front. The son of President Sulayman Franjiyyah, Dr Robert, would come from the north. He had visited Damascus last week and had met with president Hafiz al-Asad. Any other person who would be considered a representative of former president Sulayman Franjiyyah could be brought in from the North. Then the south and the remaining regions would be represented by effective leaders.

This kind of detailed information went so far as to indicate that the discussion of those details with the Phalangists led to the nomination of the two brothers, Amin and Bashir al-Jumayyil to come into the government together. This course spontaneously raised a question about the position of former president Camille Sham'un, and it created some discussion about the inevitability of bringing his two sons Duri and Danny into the government, which is made up of 24 ministers, if he were to refuse to take part in it himself.

When the bearers of this information were told that the question of the government was not so simple, they said that it would have been impossible to put it into practice in the past. But today, the situation has changed, especially after the results of the parliamentary discussion appeared and the relationship between prime minister Dr al-Huss and speaker of the chamber of deputies Kamil al-As'ad became lukewarm.

The aforementioned lukewarm relationship is an accurate fact when viewed from most angles. Prime minister al-Huss is saying in his private gatherings that he was distressed with the position that Speaker al-As'ad

had taken on his government and that he had reproved him for it. This is because what happened in the discussions of the chamber of deputies was unjustified unless the purpose behind it was to fragment and undermine the government and then leave it hanging in limbo.

Some sources add that there is a feeling in the government that what happened in the discussions of the chamber of deputies was the result of a coordinated effort that existed between the presidential palace and Speaker al-As'ad and that its long-term objective was to weaken the government so as to make the possibilities of replacing it with a national coalition government more feasible.

A member of the Independent Parliamentary Bloc, deputy Mikhayil al-Dahir says that such an interpretation of what happened in parliament is an attempt to cover up the government's inability [to act] by making accusations left and right. What is being said about speaker al-As'ad is false and inaccurate. Parliamentary displeasure with the government's shortcomings has reached its peak and has turned to daily pressure that is exerted on the Speaker of the Chamber. Therefore, al-As'ad scheduled a session for debate so that every group could say its opinion in the Chamber and not outside it, and the proper, democratic course could thus continue. Had he been planning to blow up the government, he would have followed a different course that would have begun by supporting the opposition and tightening the grip on the government. This would have ended with an agreement to take the four ministers of the Independent Bloc out of the government.

Then al-Dahir adds that the government did admit its shortcomings and then it continued to deviate to the extreme from the democratic course and from proper logic. Prime minister Salim al-Huss who is respected for his integrity and his objectivity made a considerable error in the style which he authorized on the strength of his rank when he tried to cover up the shortcomings with petty, detailed justifications. He stated, for example, in the ministerial statement that the fate of the major fundamental questions from which Lebanon is suffering is tied to a disagreement over a stipulation or an article in the Army Organization Law.

Al-Dahir affirmed that the survival of the government after everything that happened has become impossible; that the deliberations that were underway behind the scenes affirm the approach of the possibility that an expanded government can be formed; and that the investigation into the names has gone beyond the boundaries of generalities.

This picture conflicted with a contradictory view that was identified by more than one minister and more than one deputy.

A deputy who is close to Jumblatt expressed his opinion that the notion of changing the government would fail because it clashed with well-known traditional obstacles. These begin with the dispute over the questions of security and the army and go as far as the dispute over the notion and the interpretation of the items of reconciliation and relations with Syria and the Palestinian Resistance. They also include internal political disputes as well as the Maronite political dispute, which forced former president Sulayman Franjiyyah to say last week, "Let them form an expanded political government if they can. As far as we are concerned, we have no relationship with this question because we will not shake the hands of those who are still destroying Lebanon, who are giving Israel opportunities to divide and destroy it and who are placing their bets on the unknown that is filled with evil intentions."

The same deputy then says that speaking about an expanded political government is tantamount to a new morphine shot that would make the Lebanese people forget their other matters. By the time the effect of that morphine shot wears off, new morphine shots would have become available. Everybody would forget about the government, and the present government would stay in its place. At best two Maronite ministers and a Durzi minister may be added to the cabinet to fill the vacuum that would result from the resignation of former president Charles Helu and the death of the late Shaykh Bahij Taqiy al-Din. These two Maronites may be President Helu himself and the former minister of the interior, Dr Salah Salman.

Possibilities that there may be surprises invalidate this notion at a moment when such possibilities are naturally pertinent especially in a country where everything has become possible as well as impossible at the same time.

8592

CSO: 4802

NEED FOR UNIFIED ARMY STRESSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 16 May 80 pp 13, 14

/Article by Amin al-Siba'i: "Kamil al-As'ad between Bitterness and Despair: Transferring the Political Dispute to the Army Will Lead to the Collapse of the Army and to Partition!"/

/Text/ During his official visit to Lebanon last week--a visit following one he made to Israel--Mr P. T. Liu, the aide to Mr Brian Urquhart, assistant secretary general of the United Nations, went to Tillat al-Khayyat, to the al-Burj al-Akhdar Building specifically, to meet with the chairman of the Chamber of deputies, Mr Kamil al-As'ad, in his private office.

At the beginning of the meeting, Mr Liu presented Chairman al As'ad with the details of the existing situation in the south, the state of the international forces there, and the contacts United Nations circles and several major countries are making with Israel (on grounds that it is a major party to the dispute which threatens southern Lebanon) to dispel the danger of a total collapse in the situation in the south and place the international forces there in a stronger position, particularly in the wake of the events which led to some deaths and casualties in their ranks.

In his discussion with Chairman al-As'ad, the international emissary displayed the tendency to believe that the situation prevailing in the Middle East has a direct influence on the international forces' task in the south and to a large degree, without exonerating Israel, suspended by implementation of the decisions taken by the International Security Council.

Similarly, the international emissary, while presenting the information and impressions at his disposal, was anxious to listen to all the views, information, recommendations and solutions the Lebanese officials had.

At this point Chairman al-As'ad ventured to express his full viewpoint on the problem of the south, concentrating his discussion on defining the gaps whose continued presence he believed would increase the volume of the international losses and push the southern region into further deterioration and catastrophe, as a result enabling Israel to achieve its old

objectives and profit by the risks which Lebanon is suffering from in advance, which are embodied most of all in striking out at Lebanon's national unity, occupying its territory, dispossessing the people of the south and imposing settlement on all groups, while dominating the waters and after all these disasters automatically pushing the country toward a framework of partition and secession.

Chairman al-As'ad defined the general features of the gaps which exist to the international emissary and asserted to him that Lebanese, Arab and international inability to deter Israel consequently will mean encouraging the evildoer to commit his evil acts, which is a perverse situation in turn strengthened by the fact that the Lebanese government is not able to exercise its natural role on southern territory--an exercise which, were it to occur, could strengthen the international forces' powers and consequently result in silencing the illegal arms which have turned the southern territory into a theater for their operations.

Chairman al-As'ad talked about international responsibility to the south. He talked about the Lebanese government's responsibility specifically, wondering if insisting on sending the army to the south and adopting a decision to apply the Security Council resolutions by force would embarrass or confuse the international forces, and, if so, why these forces remain between the hammer and the anvil, receiving blows and offering sacrifices without being able to defend themselves and their positions.

The answer of the international emissary, Mr Liu, was that the United Nations has a full idea of the state of the international forces in the south and the conditions of the forces around them. It knows that these observations are correct and is trying to close the gaps by understanding the existing situation; it knows that the secretary general of the United Nations, Dr Kurt Waldheim, has in his official reports to the Security Council repeatedly defined responsibility and those responsible, explicitly pointing his finger at Israeli responsibility and calling upon the international community to move in new directions to apply the Security Council resolutions with the least possible tension, losses and violence; and it knows that diverse new activity has started to crystallize in this direction following the episode of the killing of the two Irish soldiers in the Bint Jubayl area.

Mr Liu then told Chairman al-As'ad that the United Nations is content with and supports every Lebanese demand calling for the strengthening of the international forces in the south and the dispatch of the Lebanese army. This is natural, for how can the United Nations and the countries contributing to the international forces complain and think about withdrawing their forces at the very moment the Lebanese officials are discussing the status of these forces from the angle at which Chairman al-As'ad views it, or wondering for example who is asking these politicians to choose between strengthening the effectiveness of the international forces and ending their mission in the south while their presence remains ineffective and unproductive?

After the conclusion of the meeting and Mr Liu's statement that the presence of the international forces in the south had occurred in accordance with a request by the Lebanese authorities for assistance in extending their dominance over the region, and that efforts are being made to reduce difficulties, in cooperation with Lebanon, which he would prefer not to discuss in detail. Chairman al-As'ad returned to a meeting which the heads of his party had been holding in another room of his private office.

Chairman al-As'ad told one of the heads of the party "You remember that when I warned about the dangers of paralyzing the international forces' movement a year or more ago and demanded that either these forces' task be improved and they be supported by the Lebanese army or that their mission in Lebanon end, some officials and diplomats in the government rose up in arms against this attitude. Some of them made statements which were all devoted to responding to my viewpoint, declaring that did the international forces not exist, even in their current condition, it would have been incumbent on Lebanon to request them, that these forces did not bear responsibility for the continued deterioration in the south, that we must not repeat the story of the citizen who loses his case and proceeds to accuse the judge, and that we must not resort to this style of talking about the international forces lest the international community terminate their mission and pull them out of Lebanon."

al-As'ad said that he pressed his point of view and repeated it on numerous occasions in various places, in the belief on his part that it was important and pertinent: "Even Lebanon's ambassador to the United Nations, Mr Ghassan al-Tuwayni, gave a statement about 2 months ago in which in effect he said that if the international forces remained as they were in the south, Lebanon would review their mission. Those who rose up against my viewpoint in the past were silent over al-Tuwayni's view, even though the two positions are similar and in spite of the difference in time, which underlines the fact that if we had presented this point of view officially to the international community a year ago we would have been more successful than today in changing some features of the situation prevailing in the south."

Chairman al-As'ad said, "A number of years ago Israel decided to liquidate all its accounts with the Palestinian people on Lebanese territory, not to mention the other places from which the guerrillas take off into occupied territories and not to mention whether these takeoffs come to Israel from abroad or take place inside it. In emphasis of this, Israeli officials have made Lebanon responsible for the events which have been carried out and are being carried out on the West Bank by the Palestinians residing there, and they have threatened to respond to this upheaval by operations which as usual occur on Lebanese territory. I do not know what the government has done to face this attitude but in this sort of situation it is necessary to make the necessary international contacts to explain this view and demand that the international community intervene before time passes--

if there still is time which has not yet passed--to prevent Israel from using the upheaval as an excuse for its reprisal operations against our territory."

In his private discussions, Chairman al-As'ad is filled with bitterness, disgust and despair. He always wonders if the efforts he has made in his capacity as chairman of the Chamber of Deputies to preserve the continued existence of the government, with its constitutional institutions, preserve the role of the Chamber of Deputies and even insist on the attainment of the codification of such legislation as the army law which is aimed at achieving reconciliation are worth the effort he has exerted, since the elements of parliament in their totality have remained either frozen or the object of a give and take, of a takeoff toward a dispute which has reached the point of a blowup within the government because of the provisions of the decree organizing the army--as the prime minister, Dr Salim al-Huss, admitted in the statement he made before the Chamber of Deputies.

The bitterness with which all Chairman al-As'ad's conversations overflow--which sometimes prompts him to think of traveling to seek rest and treatment--causes him to place his finger on wounds in some of his conversations.

For example, he says, "When I raised with the international emissary the probability that the government would hint at perhaps reviewing the status of the international forces in the south and would get to the point of discussing the termination of this role, he told me, 'We in the Security Council and the United Nations, in the context of the countries contributing to the international forces, are following up on discussion of the best resolutions and positions to enable us to pursue our mission.' None of the people concerned with the matter have yet reached the point of adopting a decision to withdraw from the south."

In his conversation, Chairman al-As'ad came to the many experiences which the regime and the Chamber of Deputies had gone through. He paused before the subject of the delay in discussing sending the Lebanese army to the south. He said, "The independent parliamentary bloc recently discussed this issue from the standpoint of discussing the reasons prompting the government to suspend the decision to send the army to the south. The bloc considered that there was no single convincing reason for this suspension or delay and that if the reason was related to the ministerial dispute over the decree organizing the army, there was absolutely no connection between the two issues. The problem of the south is an old one with ramifications and sending the army there is a national action connected with the simplest rule of military missions, which is to defend territory, extend legitimate authority over it, and defend sovereignty and independence. The army battalion which stopped at Kawkaba and the other battalion which reached the Tabnin rear were sent in implementation of this premise. In addition one

should realize that the step of sending the army to the south was one which was unanimously agreed upon in Lebanon and in the Arab context in light of the resolution adopted by the Arab summit conference in Tunis."

Chairman al-As'ad then went into the gaps in the government position, pausing at the protest which Premier al-Huss raised against the articles of the decree organizing the army. Chairman al-As'ad told some chiefs of his party, with utter bitterness and sense of despair, "Such a position will guarantee that the collapse of the military organization will result as soon as the position is announced in the manner it was announced, because when you admit that you, a responsible person, are opposed to your colleagues in government concerning basic stipulations in the decree organizing the army, you will have contributed, even without knowing or intending to, to transferring the contagion of this dispute into the military organization itself and establishing a wall of factional dispute again, threatening everything that it built or everything which has been built inside this organization with collapse, and you will consequently have driven the entire army to an obscure destiny.

"You can clearly realize in advance," Chairman al-As'ad continued to talk, "that just getting into labyrinths like this and arriving at disastrous results such as exposing the coherence of the army to danger means once again throwing the country into the labyrinths of dissension and consequently the attainment of partition."

Chairman al-As'ad said that he still feared that everything he has preserved has been lost and that he believed that linking the decision to send the army to the south, for example, to the dispute over the executive decree mentioned above would leave the door wide open to movement by those people who would be harmed by the legitimate authority's return to the scene and would also mean that they would be able to trap the military organization and trap the unity of the country subsequently at any time.

al-As'ad considered that political bankruptcy dominates the situation and that there are negative results which forcefully present themselves on the domestic scene as a result of this bankruptcy.

Is Chairman al-As'ad's position to be considered a natural consequence of his dispute with Premier Salim al-Huss? Is it a link in a chain of movements aimed at sweeping away the present government?

Premier Salim al-Huss' circles state that Chairman al-As'ad's insistence on holding a general discussion session was a step in the direction of weakening the government so that it would be easy to eliminate it later. This position is clear and provokes al-Huss' reproach of al-As'ad.

Chairman al-As'ad's circles assert that the issue is much bigger than this, that when the chairman of the parliament appealed for a general discussion he was responding to a parliamentary desire expressed by the majority and

was functioning within the context of parliamentary democracy, not carrying out either a scheme to eliminate the government or a scheme to weaken Premier al-Huss, and that the deputies in the majority realize this fact. It is natural that the government should discuss, supervise and ask, and it is not permissible for it to complain about the parliament's zeal in carrying out its mission, because the parliament has no relationship to the government's weakness and deficiency, if it is proved that such weakness and deficiency exists.

These circles also state that Chairman al-As'ad refuses to give press interviews lest the obstacles remain on the one hand and he be accused of partisanship on the other. However, he cannot be silent for long when he sees that everyone differs over certain peripheral details and stands in amazement in the face of a decision which ought to have been taken a long time ago--that of sending the army to the south to defend territory, honor and dignity and perform the simplest duties of authority.

How long will Chairman al-As'ad's silence last?

Matters depend on their development and on what lies concealed in coming weeks.

11887
CSO: 4802

PARLIAMENT RATIFIES NEW TAX LEGISLATION

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 16 May 80 p 6

/Article: "The Law Modifying the Income and Building Property Tax: Exemption of Industrial Organization Profits for 10 Years under Specific Conditions"/

/Text/ In a single article, the Chamber of Deputies yesterday ratified the draft law modifying some provisions of the Income Tax Law, the Law on Building Property Tax, the Law on the Collection of Direct Taxes and similar decrees.

The most conspicuous modifications are that industrial organizations are permitted to have part of their net profits covered by sums spent on construction of productive industrial equipment or construction of housing for their employees and that organizations built as of 1980 are exempted from income tax for a period of 10 years on condition that they be bound by the government's plan to establish industries in the regions it specifies.

It is worth mentioning that these exemptions are among the demands of the Industrialists' Society.

The new law will subject companies with Lebanese funds to an absolute tax of 12 percent. The law stipulates new tax allowances for sections of net imports which are subjected to tax and suspends tax on building property in the event increases are halted as a consequence of the tenant's deprivation of rented property for security reasons in conditions of war and general disturbances.

Here are the modifications which were approved:

Article One. The new article whose text is as follows will be added to the Income Tax Law:

Article Five Bis.

One. Industrial organizations may cover a specific portion of their annual net profits with the sums they allocate to internal investment as of 1980 under the following conditions:

1. Investment must be made for the sake of attaining any of the following goals:

A. Establishing new industrial equipment which will result in increasing the organization's productive capacity.

B. Constructing housing to domicile employees and wage-earners.

The annual housing allowance paid out per dwelling must not exceed 15 percent of total salary.

Exemption of Profits

Two. 1. The profits of industrial organizations constructed in Lebanon as of the year 1980 will be exempted from income tax for a period of 10 years at a maximum as of the date on which production starts if these organizations meet all the following conditions, within the maximum shown in Paragraph D below:

A. The factory must be built in one of the regions the government wishes to develop as determined by a decree to be adopted by the Council of Ministers.

B. The objective of the organization must be to produce new goods and materials which were not produced in Lebanon prior to 1 January 1980.

C. The value of the fixed assets the new organization possesses in Lebanon and allots to the production of new goods and materials must not be less than 2 million Lebanese pounds.

D. The total profits exempt from income tax in all years of exemption must not in any case exceed the value of the fixed assets before depreciation constructed by the date of start of production.

Article Two. The text of Section Five of Article Seven of the Income Tax Law will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

7. Depreciation calculated on the basis of the original cost price of the elements of the material fixed assets belonging to the organization.

The minister of finance will adopt a decision in accordance with the recommendation of the general financial director determining these depreciation rates within minimum and maximum limits, and the taxpayer may choose the

rate or rates which are in keeping with his organization's conditions on condition that he deposit a schedule of depreciation with the financial department concerned in advance. Otherwise he will be considered to have selected the lowest depreciation rate.

The rate or rates chosen will remain fixed and binding throughout the period specified for the amount of the depreciation, which will equal the original cost price.

Fixed nonmaterial assets may be depreciated only if they must be abandoned without compensation when a specific period has ended, in which case they will be depreciated in equal annual instalments throughout the period remaining before this period ends.

Article Three. The text of Section 10 of Article Seven of the Income Tax Law will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

10. Debts due whose total loss is actually proved, after the necessary measures to collect them have been taken.

Article Four. The section whose text follows will be added to the first part of Article Seven of the income Tax Law:

11. The addition imposed on the revenues of building properties on behalf of municipalities, in implementation of Article 57 of the law of 17 September 1962 applying to finance companies.

Article Five. The new paragraph whose text follows will be added to the end of Article 8 of the Income Tax Law:

Building property revenues which finance companies collect will be subject to the relative tax stipulated in Article 55 of Law 17 of September 1972; at the same time, these revenues will be subject to income tax in accordance with net profit as defined in accordance with Article Seven of the Income Tax Law. On computation of the income tax on the profit obtained in a given year, the relative tax on building property incurred on incomes for the abovementioned year will be subtracted from the base of this profit, but, if the value of the income tax due from a company is lower than the value of the relative building property tax, the latter tax will be sufficient and no income tax will be incurred.

Article Six. The text of Article Nine of the Income Tax Law will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

The full value of shares of profits which Lebanese finance companies collect as a consequence of possessing stocks and shares of other Lebanese companies will be deducted from their incomes which are subject to the

tax stipulated in this chapter but will continue to be subjected to the tax mentioned in Article 72 bis (new) of the Income Tax Law if they are redistributed.

Provision of Declarations

Article Seven. The text of Paragraph One of Article 13 of the Income Tax Law will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

Presentation of a real profits declaration will be made to the competent financial departments by 1 April of every year, and by 1 June as regards finance companies. This will include a copy of the budget, a summary of the profit and loss account, a statement of the expenditures and burdens which must be deducted in implementation of Article 7 and a report by those entrusted with the audit along with the explanatory data referring to it in companies subjected to the audit system in accordance with the provisions of the Commerce Law. Persons entrusted with the audit must respond in the shortest possible period of time to all requests for data or clarifications presented to them by the financial departments concerned with income tax regarding the audit they have carried out, under penalty of the application of the provisions of Article 108 of the Income Tax Law.

The Rest Is without Modification

Article Eight. The new paragraph whose text follows will be added to the end of the text of Article 30 of the Income Tax Law:

The accounting regulations to which income tax payers are subject by virtue of unified accounting decrees will be put into effect by decrees to be adopted in accordance with the recommendation of the minister of finance.

Article Nine. The text of Article 31 of the Income Tax Law included in Legislative Decree No 88 dated 30 June 1977 will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

Article 31. Tax will be imposed on real profits or profits determined in fixed fashion after a sum has been deducted from them equal to the minimum wages officially stipulated for the private sector for every natural person who is a taxpayer. 1,200 Lebanese pounds will be added to the value of this deduction for married taxpayers and 1,000 Lebanese pounds for every legitimate child still under his responsibility under the following conditions:

Males, if they are not over age 18.

Females, before their marriage, or widowed or divorced.

The number of children benefiting may not exceed five.

If the taxpayer's wife engages in an occupation or occupies a position subject to tax, the husband will benefit from the deduction granted to a single man. If both spouses have children under their responsibility the father will be given an additional deduction for his children in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraph of this article.

Tax on estimated profits will be imposed after deduction of a sum equal to the sum due for a married person without children, whatever the domestic status of the taxpayer might be.

Article 10. The two paragraphs whose text follows will be added to the end of the text of Article 32 (new) of the Income Tax Law:

Contrary to what was stated above, the profits of finance companies (joint stock companies and companies with limited liability, or, as far as limited partnership stock companies go, the limited partners) will be subject to a relative tax of 22 percent (twenty-two percent) to which will be added the municipality share stipulated in Article 33 following, and these profits will be exempted from construction tax.

The tax rate referred to in the previous paragraph will be reduced to half if the profits of the finance companies are taken as a result of the following real estate activities:

1. Construction of buildings, division of these buildings into apartments or floors, and their sale to others.
2. Construction of housing units and their sale to others.
3. Division of lands into plots for housing purposes, by agreement of the competent civil organization departments or municipalities, and their sale to others.

Reappraisal

Article 11. The text of Article 45 of the Income Tax Law will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

First, organizations subject to the system of paying taxes on real profits may reappraise the elements of the fixed assets they possess every 5 years in accordance with the principles stipulated in the Commerce Law for appraising assets as advances in finance companies.

Article 12. The new paragraph whose text follows will be added to the end of the text of Article 50 of the Income Tax Law:

3. Fifty (50) percent of the sums paid as salary allowance and actual flying hours of pilots and other airplane crew members subject to tax in Lebanon.

Article 13. The following new apargrapn will be added to the end of Article 52 of Legislative Decree No 144 dated 12 June 1959 and its modifications (the Income Tax Law):

"In all cases it is mandatory that the declaration presented by the employer to the finance department concerned with income tax conform to the declaration presented by him to the National Social Insurance Fund as regards the names of employees and the total wages, salaries and compensations paid to them. A fine ranging from 500 to 5,000 (five thousand) Lebanese pounds will be imposed in the event the provisions of this paragraph are violated and the minutes on the application of this paragraph will be organized by a decree issued by the minister of finance.

Article 14. The text of Article 56 of the Income Tax Law included in Legislative Decree No 88 dated 30 June 1977 will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

Article 56. Tax will be imposed on annual net revenues defined in accordance with the provisions of Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Income Tax Law after a sum for every taxpayer who is a natural person is deducted from these revenues equal to the minimum amount of wates officially stipulated for the private sector; 1,200 Lebanese pounds will be added annually to the value of this deduction for married taxpayers and 1,000 Lebanese pounds for each legitimate child who is still under his responsibility under the following conditions:

Males, if they are not over age 18.

Females, before their marriage, or if they are widows or divorced.

The number of children benefiting must not exceed five.

If the taxpayer's wife engages in an occupation or occupies a position subject to tax, the husband will benefit from the deduction granted to a single man. If both spouses have children under their responsibility the father will be given an additional deduction for his children in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraph of this article.

Definition of the Tax Allowance

Article 15. The text of Article 58 of Legislative Decree No 144 dated 12 June 1959 and its modification contained in Law No 34/75 dated 23 September 1975 will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

Article 58 (new). The tax allowance is defined as (see table).

Article 16. The text of Article 4 of Legislative Decree No 88 dated 30 June 1977 including the modification of the text of Paragraph Two of

Article 59 of the Income Tax Law will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

The deduction from the base will be computed at a sum equal to 27 (twenty-seven) Lebanese pounds for each day for wage earners who receive daily wages, regardless of their family status.

(The rest remains unchanged.)

Article 17. The text of Section One of Article 71 of the Income Tax Law will be abrogated and Article 72 (bis) (new) whose text is as follows will be added to the Income Tax Law:

Dividends of Lebanese finance companies will be subject to a relative tax of 12 percent in all cases even if the company is exempt from Chapter One tax in implementation of Articles 5 and 5 (bis).

Article 18. The text of Article 116 of the Income Tax Law is modified as follows:

All real and legal persons who enjoy special exemptions or exclusions from income tax, as well as all commercial companies which enjoy a permanent exemption in implementation of Article 5 of this legislative decree, must present annual permits and data to the competent financial departments.

Article 19. The following new paragraph will be added to the end of Article 37 of the Building Property Tax Law:

Owners of real estate can protest these appraisals to the competent financial department within a maximum period of 2 months from the date they are notified, and the head of the Revenue Department will review the contested appraisals in final form.

The minutes of the application of these provisions will be determined by instructions issued by the minister of finance.

Article 20. The text of the last paragraph of Article 56 of the Building Property Tax Law will be abrogated and replaced by the following text:

Financial companies will also be exempted from escalating taxes and the provisions related to them and will remain subject to the relative tax specified in Article 55 of this law and the appendices following it.

Article 21. The paragraph whose text follows will be added to the end of the text of Article 5 of Legislative Decree No 147 dated 12 June 1959:

In specific cases these may be determined by decrees issued in accordance with recommendation of the minister of finance if the taxpayers are

committed to paying tax on profits, revenues or salaries declared upon declaration and before issuance of the basic tables of taxes due on them, provided that these tables are issued subsequently in the form of a settlement; in this case late payment penalties will be in effect as of the beginning of the termination of the declaration period.

Tax Suspension

Article 22. Article 7 (bis), whose text follows, will be added to Legislative Decree No 147 dated 12 June 1959:

The collection of tax on building property will be suspended in accordance with a request presented by the owner to the financial department concerned with the building property tax if revenues are suspended because the tenant is prevented from benefitting from the rental for security reasons in circumstances of war and general disturbance. The financial departments concerned will vouch for the truth of the request by all methods of proof and, by agreement of the head of the Revenue Department, will determine to suspend collection and will report this to the collection departments concerned in accordance with the chapter tables.

The collection periods will become effective again when the state of deprivation ends. The owner must notify the competent financial departments of this within a period of 2 months of the date the termination of deprivation occurs, under penalty of the imposition of a fine of 50 percent of the amount of tax due.

The provisions of this article will apply to revenues for 1975 and after.

Article 23. The following new paragraph will be added to the end of Article 30 of the Building Property Tax Law:

Proceeding from the revenues of 1975, with respect to the real property involved in Article 7 (bis) of Legislative Decree No 147 dated 12 June 1959, whose registration is requisite, /word missing/ will be suspended and will become effective again within a period subsequently to be determined by a decree issued in accordance with a recommendation by the minister of finance.

Article 24. The minutes of application of the provision of this law will be determined by decrees adopted by the Council of Ministers.

Article 25. All provisions which are contrary to the provisions of this law or do not accord with its contents will be abrogated and its provisions will be applied starting with the activities of 1980.

Article 26. This law will be effective immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette.

2 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which does not exceed	4,800	Lebanese pounds
3 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 4,800 but is less than	8,400	Lebanese pounds
4 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 8,400 but is less than	12,000	Lebanese pounds
6 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 12,000 but is less than	24,000	Lebanese pounds
8 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 24,000 but is less than	36,000	Lebanese pounds
11 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 36,000 but is less than	48,000	Lebanese pounds
14 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 48,000 but is less than	60,000	Lebanese pounds
18 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 60,000 but is less than	75,000	Lebanese pounds
22 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 75,000 but is less than	90,000	Lebanese pounds
25 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which exceeds 90,000 but is less than	120,000	Lebanese pounds
28 percent of the portion of net revenues subject to tax which is 120,000 Lebanese pounds and above.		

11887

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PHALANGE, LIBERALS ISSUE JOINT DECLARATION

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 17 May 80 p 3

/Article: "Joint Phalange-Liberal Committee: The Dichotomy between the Two Parties Does Not Conflict with Solidarity"/

/Text/ The joint committee of the Phalange and National Liberal Parties held a meeting in the headquarters of the "Lebanese Forces" command yesterday evening attended by President Camille Chamoun and Messrs Danny Chamoun, Harun Hilw, Charles Ghastayn, Cyril Bastras and Abu Kamal for the Liberales and the deputies Amin al-Jumayyil, George Sa'adah, and Edmond Rizq, in addition to the leader of the "Lebanese Forces," Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, Messrs Karim Baqraduni, Joseph Abu Khalil, former deputy Samir Ishaq and Pierre Sayigh for the Phalange.

At the meeting, the obstacles standing in the way of the course of the joint progress of the two parties and means to guarantee that "the dichotomy between the two parties is preserved" were discussed, along with the political and security conditions and the skirmishes which have occurred recently in some regions between elements of the two parties.

Statement

After the meeting, the following statement was issued:

The committee paused for a long time before the causes and difficulties opposing the two parties along their common course, especially the disturbance which has confronted this course in the recent period and in previous stages, and produced a report, as follows:

First, each of the two parties has its characteristics, its platform and its particular nature, and this state of affairs must consequently be taken into consideration in defining the relationship between the two in a manner guaranteeing that this dichotomy will be preserved, in its character as a direct expression of the democracy which the two parties believe in and are working for.

Second, this dichotomy, and its consequences, are part of the process of thinking within the exercise of democracy and absolutely do not conflict with the maximum solidarity between the two parties, which have sought to implant mutual relations on bases of equal integration and mutual respect.

While the committee is inspired by the exemplary spirit governing the relationship between the chiefs of the two parties, President Camille Chamoun and Shaykh Pierre al-Junayyil and the previous experiences of the two parties over the years of common struggle which they have been waging for 20-odd years, it considers that the circumstances of the difficult stage through which the nation is passing demands that relations between them develop and be implanted on clearer organizational bases. It especially stresses the following measures:

1. Creation of joint committees in the national geographic context, in which the party leaders of both parties will meet to consult and cooperate over joint action in the capital or in the regions and provinces.

2. Creation of joint committees on the sectoral level as well to coordinate the two parties' struggle, especially in the student, labor, trade union, economic and cultural spheres.

3. Consideration that the Lebanese Forces command is a necessary institution whose effectiveness must be increased through consolidation of the council which takes charge of it. To achieve this goal, the committee recommends that the commanders:

- A. Set out a strategy appropriate to the current conditions the nation's crisis is entering. In this situation one cannot fail to promote the Lebanese Front's stipulation that a respite should be granted in which the situation concerning the settlement of Palestinians will be spelled out, since that is the main obstacle before reviving the state and its institutions.

- B. Determine the number and sites of military accumulations as a first step toward combining the fighting men of the two parties and the fighting men of the organizations allied with them.

- C. Establish a joint command for security discipline in the two parties which will take charge of supervising security procedures and overseeing their implementation.

- D. Control the process of the presence of arms and collect heavy arms in places which the command council will specify.

Third, the committee observes the discord which has accompanied the relations between the two parties; this may primarily be attributed to the

violations and transgressions which some party activists or some people alleged to have affiliations with either party have committed. In order to suppress these violations and transgressions, the following measures have been agreed to:

1. Establishment of a joint disciplinary board to which transgressions and violations will be referred provided that it follow principles in investigation and judgment which will guarantee maximum effectiveness and speed.
2. Formation of a committee of specialists to set out a draft of bylaws for this board which will be presented to the committee within a period of 2 weeks.
3. Restricting this board's task to transgressions of a purely party character connected to the security of the two parties and proper relations between them.
4. Violations which lie within the framework of general rights will be controlled and those who commit them will be handed over to the legitimate national authorities.

Fourth, the committee considers that the alliance existing between the two parties, the seminal goals on which this alliance is founded and the attempts at intrigue facing them are matters which require that the two parties be asked:

- A. To suspend the process of party recruitment for a period of 6 months.
- B. To suspend the process of opening new party centers for the same period.

President Chamoun attended a brief portion of the meeting, then left, stating, "I would have liked to return to the era of my youth, and attended this meeting, which is to be considered a supplement to previous meetings and has been devoted to setting out agendas for increasing the intimacy and solidarity between the two parties. God willing, there is one hand and one heart."

11887
CSO: 4802

LATEST STATUS OF PHALANGE-SYRIAN TALKS NOTED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 17 May 80 p 2

/Article by Emil Khuri: "The Phalange-Syrian Dialogue Deepens As It Moves from the Preparatory to Political Phase"/

/Text/ Observers had not been expecting that the Phalange-Syrian dialogue would resume with such speed, especially after the al-Matn al-'Ali skirmishes, which some people were led to believe may have affected this dialogue and delayed its resumption.

However, it appears that the Syrian authorities did not have a hand in the skirmishes and their scope was limited. They ended quickly and were continued when the army captured some positions.

The Phalange-Syrian dialogue which is being followed by Deputy George Sa'adeh and Attorney Karim Bagraduni in Damascus today is expected to shift to the stage of political dialogue, with a discussion of the issues and principles which are suitable bases for an understanding.

The Phalange has prepared a working paper to this end for discussion with the Syrian party in order to work out the promulgation of a unified working paper on whose basis the dialogue will carry on.

It has been suggested that the Syrian party is anxious that the principles of reconciliation which President Sarkis declared be among the major issues of the dialogue, because it attaches great importance to putting these principles into practice in order to arrive at the attainment of a political reconciliation which will constitute the prelude to establishing a government of national federation which can spread government sovereignty out over all the territory of Lebanon and extend the army.

This is what Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam hoped would be realized during his visit to the Republican Palace and his meeting with President Sarkis, in the presence of Premier al-Huss and Minister Butrus. He proposed that political and party leaders be summoned to sign the announced reconciliation principles in spite of their differences in principle so that those

who support it may be winnowed from those who oppose it-- at which point cooperation would be made with them on that basis.

However, President Sarkis, who knows that some effective commanders have reservations about some principles of reconciliation, has preferred to concentrate on reducing the obstacles in the way of composition of an active government so that such a government could assume charge of the reconciliation principles.

Dealings with Israel and the Armed Presence

It is well known that the main obstacle to be reduced is that bearing on dealings with Israel. It is this which will be the axis of discussion in the Phalange-Syrian dialogue.

Informed sources state that there are three recommended solutions to the problem of these dealings, namely:

One, an announcement should just be made on agreement to principles in order to assert the rejection of all forms of dealing with Israel. This is the heading under which these principles lie.

The Phalange's reservations on the Arabhood of Lebanon, which, in its view, cannot mean the Islamization of Lebanon, does not provoke arguments, because no one means this when he talks about the Arabhood of Lebanon. Its reservations that the special relations between Lebanon and Syria should not mean the signing of agreements and treaties do not provoke argument either, because Syria itself asserts that it does not want to base its argument over the fact that support for the Palestinian cause does not mean settlement, because no one wants or accepts settlement.

Two, agreement should be reached in advance with the Syrian party on formulating a statement stressing refusal to deal with Israel so that issuance of a statement of this sort will have results as far as the attainment of reconciliation and formation of a national federal government go.

Three, practical and actual practice, and not verbal statements and words, should be what confirm the absence of any dealings with Israel and the Phalange would be free to act, should not receive orders from any body and should be inspired in what it does only by Lebanon's interests. It is in Syria's power, with its investigative and information gathering agencies, to vouch for this practice.

There is no argument between Syria and the Phalange over positions on the Camp David agreement because this agreement constitutes a danger to Lebanon in terms of settling the Palestinians and Israel's attempt to thwart Lebanon's economic, political and cultural role. The Phalange's

position of opposition to the Camp David agreement is proof of the fact that it does not cooperate with or deal with Israel, which is anxious to carry this agreement out.

While the sensitive, delicate point in the dialogue between the Phalange and Syria, as far as the Syrian party is concerned, is that related to dealing with Israel and the means for creating a solution to such dealings, the point which concerns the Phalange and for which it wants a remedy is that related to the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. It is this presence which constitutes the crux of the crisis; if a remedy for this is reached it will be possible to come up with a remedy on the armed Lebanese presence and the establishment of a strong government which is able to extend its sovereignty and authority over all of Lebanese territory. Therefore one can state that the issue of the relations with Israel and the issue of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon are the basis of the political discourse between the Phalange and Syria.

If it is difficult to find a solution to the armed Palestinian presence, that is because the establishment of a Palestinian state remains a plan whose attainment is remote and because there is no way to put an end to this presence before such a state is established. One solution which can be reached in the context of the current situation is the achievement of reconciliation between the Lebanese and the formation of a national federation government which can impose the authority of the state, disperse the army throughout all areas, prevent all illegitimate armed presences and control the armed Palestinian presence by returning to a precise, complete implementation of the agreements which have been reached.

The appeal for attainment of such a reconciliation and for mutual understanding among the Lebanese in order to reach this goal has been stressed by senior Syrian officials in the presence of Lebanese commanders who have visited Damascus, on grounds that that is the only way to save Lebanon and bring it out of its trials.

The success of the Phalange-Syrian dialogue and its progression to a solution of the problem of dealing with Israel will have the effect of opening the gates to a dialogue with the "National Movement," even if the discussion of the northern issue is postponed to a later stage, when Syria will have formed a conception of a solution for this issue, beginning by handing the accused detainees in the Ihdin incident over to the Lebanese authorities before bringing them to trial or releasing them if a comprehensive solution to the northern issue is reached.

The regime, with all its forces, supports the Phalange-Syrian dialogue and is trying to provide the means for its complete success. The reduction of many of the obstacles which are in the way of the attainment of

reconciliation and formation of a national federation government which can alone deter the danger of settlement and partition and restore the unity of the people, territory and institutions of Lebanon, spread out the army and extend the sovereignty of the state over all Lebanese territory depends on the success of this dialogue.

11887

CSO: 4802

NEW DECREE ISSUED SETTING MINIMUM WAGE

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 17 May 80 pp 1, 12

/Article: "Text of the Final Draft Decree To Raise Wages and Set a Minimum"/

/Text/ The draft of a decree stipulating the determination of an official minimum for the wages of employees and workers and the rate of inflation has been prepared in final form and the prime minister ... minister of social affairs and labor have signed it. It now needs only the signature of the president and assignment of a number and date. This is the text of the draft decree:

The president of the republic:

In accordance with the constitution;

In accordance with Law No 36/67 dated 16 May 1967 determining the minimum wages of employees and workers and the inflation rate;

In accordance with studies and tables on fluctuations in cost of living prices;

In accordance with Decree No 2007 dated 10 May 1979 determining an official minimum for workers' and employees' wages and the rate of inflation;

In accordance with the recommendation of the minister of labor and social affairs;

After seeking the advice of the State Consultation Council;

And after receipt of the Council of Ministers' agreement during its meeting held 8 April 1980:

Decrees the following:

Article One. As of 1 January 1980, the official minimum monthly wage will be set at 675 pounds. This will be applied in accordance with the

provisions of Articles One and Two of Law No 36/67 dated 16 May 1967.

Article Two. A cost of living increase will be added to the wages wage-earners received on 31 December 1979 amounting to:

A. Twenty-nine (29) percent for the first portion of the salary, up to the sum of 1,000 pounds.

B. Nineteen (19) percent for the second portion of the salary, in excess of the sum of 1,000 pounds and up to 2,000 pounds.

C. Eleven (11) percent for the third portion of the salary, in excess of the sum of 2,000 pounds, provided that this increase not be less than 150 pounds for wage earners who are covered by the minimum in accordance with the provisions of Articles One and Two of Law 36/67 dated 16 May 1967 and that it not exceed the sum of 625 pounds.

Article Three. Wage-earners whose work contracts predate the issuance of this decree and who are still actually working in their original organization on the date this decree is issued will benefit from the increase stipulated in Article Two of this decree.

Article Four. To compute the value of the increase in the cost of living which is the subject of this decree, consideration will be given to the basic wage the wage-earner received before he benefited from any conciliatory cost of living inflation increase granted to him between implementation of Decree 2007 dated 10 May 1979 and the implementation of this decree.

Article Five. Consideration will be given to increases which are explicitly described by contract or statute or in registers of administrative statements as having been granted between implementation of Decree No 2007 dated 10 May 1979 and the date of the issuance of this decree because of the high cost of living covering all wage-earners in the organization without exception at the same time. The employer will have the right to deduct this increase from the value of the increase stipulated in this decree. If the value of the increase exceeds the increase received as a consequence of the application of this decree, it may not be reduced. If it is less than that increase, the wage-earner will benefit from the difference only.

Article Six. The provisions of this decree will apply to all wage-earners and employers subject to the provisions of the Labor Law issued 23 September 1946.

Article Seven. This decree will be published and publicized where need dictates. It will be in effect as of 1 January 1980.

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CSO: 4802

NEW HOUSING PLAN TO OFFER PARTIAL RELIEF

Beirut AL-'AMAL in Arabic 15 May 80 p 4

/Article: "The al-Murr Housing Plan Will Solve Part of the Shortage"/

/Text/ The housing shortage in Lebanon is in the forefront of the social crises which the people in authority are trying to resolve by various means. However, none of the plans and projects have yet succeeded in solving the shortage. The provision of housing for people with limited incomes, who constitute the great majority of Lebanese, has become an almost irremediable problem.

On this subject, the Lebanese Publication Center has prepared the following study:

The housing problem in Lebanon may be ascribed to a lack of production of housing for dwellings since the early 1970's. Economic experts now estimate that the existing shortage has come to equal 700,000 housing units and that the estimated costs of making up for this deficit range from 10 to 12 billion Lebanese pounds. In order to remedy this situation on the official level, the minister of housing, Michel al-Murr, is presenting a draft for the construction of 20,000 housing units which the government will build directly or which the private sector will build under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing. This has the objective of establishing housing complexes in all areas of Lebanon.

The al-Murr Project

For people and families with limited incomes to be able to buy these housing units, Minister al-Murr's plan calls for persons and families to receive long-term loans to be paid off in a period ranging from 15 to 25 years without any interest on the loans granted. This plan will be carried out by the reappraisal of property in Lebanon, and 15 percent of the value of the improvement made on property resulting from the expanded increases of the rates of investment in these properties will be payable to the government. We show herewith the good points of this plan and what the Lebanese citizen can gain from it:

If the value of the house is 200,000 Lebanese pounds and the loan period is 25 years, the maximum loan will be 100,000 Lebanese pounds. If the period is 20 years, the maximum loan will be 130,000 Lebanese pounds.

If the value of the house is 150,000 Lebanese pounds and the loan period is 17 years, the loan maximum will be 150,000 Lebanese pounds.

Thus we observe that according to Minister al-Murr's plan, the value of the loan will increase as the period declines; the plan will grant longer periods of up to 25 years if the value of the housing unit is set at 150,000 Lebanese pounds.

The following also shows how people with limited incomes given long terms will benefit:

If the income level is 2,500 or above, the maximum loan will be 150,000 Lebanese pounds and the loan period will be 17 years. If the income level is between 1,500 and 2,500, the loan maximum will be 130,000 Lebanese pounds and the loan period will be 20 years. If the income is below 1,500 Lebanese pounds, the loan maximum will be 110,000 pounds and the loan period will be 25 years. Here we will describe the means for paying back the loan as far as Minister al-Murr's plan goes from the standpoint of interest and payment: as we have learned, if the loan maximum is 130,000 the first payment of the loan will be roughly equal to 10,000 Lebanese pounds. Thus the monthly payments will be equal to about 542 Lebanese pounds, if the period of the loan is 20 years.

Housing Needs

The value of the social repercussions and goals of Minister al-Murr's plan is great and we consider that this plan is basically oriented toward meeting the pressing requirements of the housing problem in the country. This plan will provide suitable housing for a large number of Lebanese with limited incomes, most of whom are government employees and private sector factory workers. It will also be within the capacity of farmers to benefit from this plan.

The Chamber of Deputies has vouchsafed the fitness of Minister al-Murr's plan and unanimously agreed to it without any modifications from the standpoint of its organizational concept and financing. It is reasonable to state that this project arises from a creative idea and an innovative modern attempt for which the Lebanese citizen and businessman is distinguished when he is given the opportunity to work. This plan will contribute in a novel way to the fields of economic and social development in Lebanon.

11887

CSO: 4802

AGRICULTURAL LOAN DISBURSEMENT DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 15 May 80 p 6

/Article: "An Agricultural Meeting To Discuss Expenditure Areas for \$14-Million Loan"/

/Text/ At a meeting he held yesterday, the minister of agriculture, Joseph Skaff, discussed areas in which an international Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) loan for whose acquisition he prepared during his latest visit to Rome can be spent.

Attending the meeting were Iqbal Akhund, United Nations aid program coordinator in Lebanon; Pandu Salar, United Nations Development Program representative; Axel Bay, a Food and Agriculture Organization representative; Harris, head of the International Agricultural Development Bank delegation; acting director general of the Ministry of Agriculture Dr Mustafa Zaydan; director general of the Livestock Production Bureau, Eng Rashid Idris; director general of cooperatives, Dr Kamil Qaba'; members of the International Agricultural Development Bank delegation; and the heads of agricultural departments.

Those who met discussed the data which had been assembled by the international delegation after it had spent some weeks in Lebanon, in response to a request which the minister of agriculture had presented to the international bank to obtain long-term loans worth \$14 million at low interest to be given to small farmers in the form of loans.

Concentration on the subjects of discussion was as follows:

First, as regards the National Cooperative Lending Federation project:

Subjects of cooperation and coordination between the General Department of Cooperatives and the National Cooperative Lending Federation on the one hand and the Ministry of Agriculture on the other were discussed. It appeared that the Cooperative Federation's field of activity would be in the following areas:

Allocation of 3 million Lebanese pounds for the purchase of chemical fertilizer.

One hundred fifty thousand pounds for the purchase of pesticides and high-grade seeds.

Eight hundred thousand pounds for machinery.

Seven hundred thousand pounds for irrigation equipment.

Four hundred thousand pounds for agricultural equipment.

Five thousand farmers will benefit from this, and the International Agricultural Development Bank will provide technical assistance valued at 830,000 Lebanese pounds which will be given in the form of experts and preparation of transport equipment.

Second, Livestock Production Bureau projects:

Importation of 1,500 milch cows, at a rate of 500 per year, and distribution of them to small farmers at 5 percent interest, then establishment of three goat raising centers.

Third, Lebanese Fruit Bureau projects:

Purchase of 1.2 million field crates allocated for fruit picking from which small farmers will benefit.

Fourth, the Green Project:

Construction and asphaltting of 150 kilometers of agricultural roads, then asphaltting and maintenance of agricultural roads already built.

The minister of agriculture chaired a meeting yesterday which included the international coordinator for agricultural strategy which is in the process of being prepared and the two experts Karam and Hananiyah. He discussed the results of their mission regarding the future of the silk industry and agricultural cooperation with them.

11887

CSO: 4802

MEAT IMPORT FROM INDIA APPROVED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 16 May 80 p 5

/Article: "Agriculture Is Inclined to Allow Imports of Frozen Meat from Tropical Sources"/

/Text/ Permission to bring in frozen meat from an Indian source was the focus of a discussion chaired yesterday by the minister of agriculture, Mr Joseph Skaff, attended by Acting Director General Mr Mustafa Zaydan, the director general of the Livestock Production Bureau Mr Rashid Idris, and Messrs Emil Rizqallah, Muhammad Dimashqiyah, Wa'il Haydar and Edmond Shuwayri of the Ministry of Agriculture. Also attending the meeting were Dr Singh, the expert from the FAO organization, and Dr 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zayn of the American University in Beirut.

Those at the meeting discussed the possibility of agreeing to the importation of meat from countries which are considered to be afflicted with certain contagious animal diseases (African countries and India), the degree of danger to public health and livestock resources from these meats, and the conditions which must be authorized so that consumers may benefit from their reduced prices (about 7 pounds per kilogram) instead of having the benefit confined to the importers.

Most of those at the meeting stressed that the abovementioned meat will not endanger the health of livestock because it is boned and frozen, and the diseases to be guarded against are normally transferred by bones and glands. They pointed out that international organizations had advised that it not be imported but did not prohibit that, and that the meat is going to a number of countries, especially rich ones.

Some people recommended that technical measures be taken to examine the meat as a precaution, that it be sold in consumer cooperatives and major distribution centers, and that this be publicized.

It was mentioned that this matter was raised some time ago in the Ministry of Agriculture and that opinions on it differ between the Production Bureau, which calls for a prohibition on the importation of this meat, and some

officials of the Ministry of Agriculture who support importation of it. Previously, provisions were made to subject imports to advance permits but the Council of Ministers rejected this and demanded that the Ministry of Agriculture determine its position in favor or against.

After that, some merchants happened to import quantities of Indian meat through an unauthorized port and brought it into the markets after evading payment of customs duties on it. Meanwhile, government agencies stopped one merchant's trucks in the plant as they were transporting similar meat which he had tried to bring in lawfully.

It has been mentioned that yesterday's meeting endorsed the tendency to allow importation of the meat after receipt of agreement by the Council of Ministers, provided that the permit decree be accompanied by another decree regulating the sale in a manner beneficial to the consumer.

It has been learned that importation of the meat sequestered in the plant has been given temporary approval under customs surveillance following payment of a fiscal bond and storage of the meat until the Council of Ministers decree is issued.

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CSO: 4802

MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

PRC MEDICAL TEAM--A protocol accord between the Government of Mauritania and the People's Republic of China was signed this morning at the Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Affairs. This protocol accord provides for the sending of a 33-man medical team by the Chinese Government to work in the hospitals of (Touffa), (Bayo) and (Selibaly). The accord was signed by Mr (Ismadou Kledor), principal secretary at the Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Affairs for the Mauritanian Government and by His Excellency (Chiao Fu-yong), economic counsellor at the Chinese Embassy in Mauritania. [Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 1430 GMT 27 Jun 80]

CSO: 6400

ALI YATA SAYS REFERENDA SHOW NEED FOR OPPOSITION UNITY

Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French 12 Jun 80 p 1

[Report by Ali Yata to PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism] Central Committee meeting 8 June]

[Text] Dear Comrades: The undemocratic methods to which we have just made reference would not have taken place with such scope if the progressive forces were not so disunited. And this at a time when circumstances call upon them more than ever to come to an agreement, join ranks, synchronize their efforts to face up to the enemies of democracy and thwart the adulterations of the popular will.

To put an end to these undemocratic practices, we must unite the progressive and leftist forces. Also we cannot fail to give this problem the greatest attention in this report since we are in the process of analysing the conditions of the two referendum campaigns and to evaluate their results and implications.

In fact, during this last battle, namely the election on 30 May in particular, two orientations, two poles have crystallized:

The Regrouping of the Government Majority and That of the Opposition

On the one hand, the coalition of the government majority formed of the RNI [National Rally of Independents], of the Istiqlal and its parallel organizations and the Popular Movement. In reality, this is an alliance between the bureaucratic middle class and the traditional middle class and the landowners. That is, the strata which have profited from independence and Moroccanization and which succeeded colonialism by monopolizing the wealth of the country or by collaborating with what is left of colonialism and dividing up the pie.

The members of this group voted "yes," defending the same ideas, expressing the same attitudes, even though the lyrics of the song were at times different because of certain circumstances such as pressure from the rank and file of such and such party or because of complexes nourished because of former positions or on the basis of particular calculations concerning the future, all the more so because all of them know the anger of public opinion.

However, there was far from perfect accord inside this coalition. More than that, even inside organizations themselves, there was no unity. For example, the Istiqlal had quite a few problems. The decision to vote "yes" on the referendum of 30 May was not made unanimously. Several of its members even voted "no," and did not hesitate to announce this publicly. Other activists of this party continue to be particularly discontented, above all within the Istiqlal youth sector.

On the other side, we have the opposition front which is composed of our party, the USFP (Socialist Union of Popular Forces), UNFPUMT (Moroccan Labor Federation), CDT (Democratic Labor Federation) and UNEM (National Union of Moroccan Students). We can say that all these forces found themselves to be in the same positions, against the government majority, even if the expression of this opposition varied in form and even in substance.

Our party decided to vote and to call for a "no" vote in the two referenda. The USFP permitted freedom of vote for the first and decided to boycott the second. The UNFP decided not to participate, without conducting a campaign to let its decision be known, which was adopted by the UMT even though it did not openly state its position. As for the CDT, it allowed freedom of choice to follow the direction taken by the progressive forces on the first referendum and boycotted the second. For its part, the UNEM called for abstention on the first referendum and a boycott on the second.

Thus national public opinion found itself confronted by a veritable mosaic of opposition positions. This had a profound negative effect. We deeply regret this state of affairs. As we would have wished for the progressive forces to unify their positions and synchronize their efforts, all the more so because the lessons of the last legislative and communal elections are still present in our memories. More than that, our party, as is its custom, made several initiatives in this direction, above all in the direction of the USFP. These initiatives were the principal reasons that caused us to postpone the extraordinary session of our Central Committee, in the hope of reaching an agreement with our brothers in the USFP, an agreement which would have served as the basis for a common position of our two parties and which would have spared national public opinion the dispersion of its attention. Very unfortunately, our efforts were unsuccessful. We did, however, sense the same desire to consult and attempt to unify our positions.

If the Refusal Position Had Been Identical...

We are fully convinced that the unification of our positions would have unfailingly had a profound influence on the authorities, would have qualitatively changed the general atmosphere, would have reduced administrative and governmental pressures, would have given the participation of the masses a greater vitality and would have created the broadest possibilities of mobilization against a government majority and against the maneuvers of the opponents of democracy.

Since matters turned out differently, it is incumbent upon us to criticize certain attitudes, in a constructive spirit, in the most total respect and in complete fraternity.

In my opinion, nonparticipation means leaving the field free to the enemy to occupy it entirely; it means leaving the popular masses at the mercy of his propaganda. It is a form of flight forward. More precisely, it is a wait-and-see attitude. And wait-and-see often becomes abdication. In fact, the changes to which the progressives aspire and which the people ardently seek will never take place by the crossing of arms nor by educating the masses in indifference and inciting them to turn their backs on everything that concerns their future. These changes in question will only be realized by daily and constant action and by uninterrupted struggle. The least that can be done in this regard is to adopt a clear attitude, to try to convince the people and work to win supporters from among them.

As for the boycott, beyond the fact that our party adopted such a position in the past, we are not fervently in favor of it. In fact, the boycott abstention ploy is only profitable if it is active. That is impossible under present conditions because of the situation and the problems posed.

And if among the reasons which militate for the boycott we can cite the likelihood of the falsification of the popular will and results which will change the country's political map. Experience shows and confirms that falsification involves even votes which were withheld in boycott and even if the boycott is 100 percent successful, His Excellency the Programmer in the Ministry of Interior will tell us the opposite; i.e., what he was told to say.

From this we see that it is more worthwhile to educate the masses to join the fray, to conscientiously refuse to do that which should be refused, to say "no" to everything that is prejudicial to them and attacks their rights and interests.

Otherwise, we would objectively encourage--no matter what good faith and goodwill we may have--leftist and adventurist factions; we would open the way to all those who are lying in wait in the shadows for the proper moment to make an attack upon the democratic achievements of the people which should be enlarged and upon the relative imposed detente which has need, however, to be safeguarded and deepened.

In short, the dispersion of the left can only in any case benefit the reactionary sector, the parliamentary majority and its government coalition.

The lesson which we must absolutely draw from this is that it is time for the progressive forces to meet, unify their views of things, determine their objectives, reach an agreement on the ways and means of their actions and harmonize their efforts. In a word, they have the duty of reaching an agreement, on the same track, in the same train, in the same coach.

It is very exactly from these premises and in this same sense that our party must take the initiative to follow up on contacts with all the national forces, most particularly the progressive forces, in the first place the Socialist Union of Popular Forces upon which we call once again to take the hand that we offer it. We sincerely wish that it will respond to our appeal and will understand well the sense of our unitary spirit.

8143

CSO: 4400

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH ROMANIA DISCUSSED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 11 Jun 80 p 9

[Excerpts] On Friday, 6 June, in the office of the Chamber, Najem Abaakil, president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Casablanca prefecture, received His Excellency Dr Ovidiu Corneliu Popescu, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Socialist Republic of Romania, who was accompanied by his close associates in economic affairs.

Inspired by the desire to cooperate in the development of economic relations between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Kingdom of Morocco, the two parties reviewed a number of ideas susceptible of facilitating the firming up of this cooperation. These ideas covered basically:

--The exchange of economic missions.

--Means of facilitating contacts between Moroccan businessmen and representatives of Romanian economic sectors.

Within this framework, His Excellency the Ambassador announced the upcoming visit of a Romanian economic mission representing the maritime fishing and canning sectors.

In a related connection, the two parties discussed the possibilities of finding new methods of payment to increase the volume of trade between the two countries under conditions mutually advantageous to both parties.

Moreover, His Excellency the Ambassador emphasized the enormous possibilities offered by the Socialist Republic of Romania in the maritime fishing sector and gave assurance that his country is ready to cooperate with the Moroccan private sector, joint companies, technical assistance and the provision of cadres specialized in the maritime fishing area.

As regards the promotion of small and medium-sized Moroccan enterprises, His Excellency the Ambassador said that the Socialist Republic of Romania is ready to participate more closely in the promotion of this category of enterprises, particularly through the establishment of joint companies in

all sectors of interest to the two parties. On this point, Najem Abaakil felt it necessary to focus on a certain number of projects and to submit them to representatives of Romanian economic sectors which might be interested in an association with Morocco.

In another development, the Romanian side brought up the question of cooperation in the sector of naval shipyard development, particularly in the port of Essaouira. As regards fairs and exhibitions, His Excellency the Ambassador said that his country wishes to organize an exhibition of Romanian industrial products in Casablanca under the same conditions as the exhibition which was organized by the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Along the same lines, His Excellency the Ambassador invited Moroccan businessmen to make plans for the organization of a similar Moroccan exhibition in Romania and to participate in the Romanian International Consumer Goods Fair and the International Chemistry Exhibition.

With respect to the line of credit of \$50 million granted by Romania to Morocco for 7 years at a 4.5 percent interest rate, the two parties felt it necessary for this line of credit to be utilized by Moroccan businessmen to intensify trade between the two countries.

8143

CSO: 4400

FRENCH WEAPONS, AVIATION SUPPORT DISCUSSED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 9 Jun 80 pp 1-2

[Text] Rabat, 9 June (AFP)--In Morocco, there are two interesting possibilities for goods produced by the National Industrial Aerospace Company (SNIAS) whose chairman and managing director, Gen Jacques Mitterrand, has just met with civilian and military leaders on the occasion of a 4-day visit.

Receiving journalists on Saturday before departing for France, General Mitterrand made a point of emphasizing that his visit was limited to "contacts" and not "negotiations." These contacts permitted him at the very outset to note the satisfaction of Moroccan users of equipment manufactured by the SNIAS. They also permitted him to envisage the future. In the military sector, there are possibilities, particularly for armed helicopters. Also, the "Gazelle Hot" system (helicopters and antitank missiles) already tested by the Moroccan army seems particularly adapted to its needs. However, it is encountering competition from American equipment.

The "Hot" missile, the only one of its kind, has pierced all the armor plate now in service and is already being delivered to the Moroccan army which is installing it on land vehicles, just as the older "SS 11" missiles with which the army was already equipped. The Royal Armed Forces also have a light antitank missile, the "Milan," which seems to be quite satisfactory. For its part, the navy is in the process of reequipping itself with the "Exocet" weapons system. Firing positions for this sea-to-sea missile are already being installed on corvettes being built for Morocco in Spain.

The navy, which is responsible for surveillance over and defense of 3,400 kilometers of coast, is also studying the possibility of equipping itself more or less over the long-term with surveillance helicopters. The SNIAS which last year obtained a Moroccan coast guard contract for the sale of 93 "Dauphin" craft hopes that this possibility will become a reality, in spite of its cost. The "Puma" is already being used by the Moroccan army and gendarmerie. In the civilian sector, prospects are linked to the development and renovation of "Royal Air Maroc's" equipment. The national Moroccan company which is equipped entirely with "Boeing" aircraft could be interested particularly in the purchase of two "Airbuses" which will be used for the transport of Moroccan fruits and vegetables to Gulf countries.

In any event, "Royal Air Maroc" is going to have to soon face up to problems posed by the obsolescence of the "Boeing 707," the increase in requirements which the "747's" will not meet and the growth in air freight.

"We have the answers," General Mitterrand said. "However, we are in competition, my 'Boeing' competitors were leaving."

The purchase of the "Airbus" by Morocco would accentuate the penetration of the North African market by this aircraft which has already been adopted by "Air Afrique" and Tunisia.

In a related connection, the SNIAS is carrying on maintenance activities in Morocco through its 99 percent-owned subsidiary, "Maroc Aviation." This company principally handles inspection and maintenance of equipment and instruments aboard planes and helicopters of the Air Force and Gendarmerie. Established in 1951 and always in a deficit posture, the company failed in 1977. It was restructured as the result of an initiative by the Moroccan authorities and for the first time this year it has produced a positive financial statement.

Finally, with respect to long-term prospects, General Mitterrand emphasized the interest which Morocco would have in choosing a satellite telecommunications and television system which is less costly in new countries than the installation of an earth infrastructure.

8143

CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

BRIEFS

CHINESE MEDICAL DELEGATION--With respect to the Moroccan-Chinese medical cooperation agreement which was signed Thursday in Fes with the Chinese vice minister of health, Tan Yun Ho, Dr Rahhali Rahal, [Moroccan minister of health], said that the agreement deals with the exchange of doctors and experts between the two countries and the exchange of experience in the sectors of traditional medicine and medicinal plants. He added that according to the terms of this agreement a team of 10 high-ranking Chinese specialists in the field of organ transplatnation and the treatment of major burn cases will come to Morocco and will serve in the Meknes hospital. He explained that Chinese specialists have shown themselves to be very competent in the technique of microsurgery which consists in reattaching amputated members. Morocco, he went on to say, also intends to install two teams of Chinese specializing in acupuncture, in Taza and Errachidia provinces. He also said that Moroccan experts will be sent to the People's Republic of China to study problems which have not yet been solved by this friendly country, such as malaria, paludism, tuberculosis and belharziosis, diseases which have been eradicated in Morocco. He went on, "We now have Moroccan experts in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Mauritania to cooperate with these countries in that sector." [Text] [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 7, 8 June 80 pp 1-2] 8143

SEIZURE 'AL-BAYANE' ISSUE--We have just learned that the 6 June 1980 issue of the French language version of our newspaper, AL-BAYANE, was seized in Casablanca. For now, we do not know whether this arbitrary administrative measure has been extended to other regions of the country. We energetically protest this violation of the law of freedom of the press and this characteristic attack against the democratization process. We dare to hope that such acts will not be repeated at a time when censorship is supposed to have totally disappeared. [Text] [Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French 7 Jun 80 p 1] 8143

CSO: 4400

BANNING OF COMMUNIST, U.S. IDEOLOGICAL LITERATURE URGED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 28 May 80 p 3

[Editorial: "Way are Foreign Embassies and Consulates Allowed to Distribute Poisonous Literature Propagating Foreign Ideology Harmful to the National Ideology?"]

[Text] According to a report published by NAWA-I-WAQT, an embassy of a powerful country in Islamabad tried to distribute books and literature harmful to the interests of Pakistan during the Eleventh Conference of the Islamic Foreign Ministers. But these books and literature, which pertained to the situation in Afghanistan and were meant to misguide the delegates, were confiscated just in time.

There is nothing new or unusually surprising about this report. Two days ago we reported that inspite of the fact that the Babrak Karmal government has not been recognized, a few consulates and embassies working for him have been freely involved in their repugnant activities. In Pakistan, not only the Karmal government, but a few embassies of communist and socialist countries as well as western capitalist countries, have been openly distributing literature harmful to our ideology and life-style. Such embassies and their cultural centers have been extensively involved in brainwashing our youngsters, some of whom have even been trained to serve as representatives and interpreters of foreign ideology, beliefs, and national personalities. They, in effect, have turned into rebels against their own national ideology while working as foreign agents.

While efforts are being made at the national level to liberate the country from the yoke of the super powers by adopting a truly nonaligned foreign policy, it is necessary to stop the embassies of big powers from activities aimed at dividing our people by classifying them into various international categories, creating leftists and rightists as followers of either Carter or Brezhnev, and thus weakening the unique identity of Moslems. We are cautioning that the said embassies are pouring large sums of money for the purpose of buying our students and youngmen and for setting up bookfairs where American and Russian books are not only displayed and sold at very low prices, but given away free as gifts and donations. Moreover, agents

are hired to spread the forbidden literature and pamphlets, write slogans on the walls and cause panic by spreading rumors and evil propaganda in the streets.

How come the government is so much concerned about protecting the delegates but, at the same time, appears to be so oblivious of safeguarding its masses against the misleading literature of the embassies? Besides, since the embassies of Pakistan in Moscow, Tashkent, Kabul, and other communist countries are not allowed to distribute literature pertaining to Pakistani ideology and beliefs, why allow Friendship House in Pakistan to spread its poisonous propaganda? Why is censorship not applied to this foreign literature just as it is applied to domestic literature? Therefore, we would like to repeat our earlier demand to immediately shut down not only all those consulates which are working for the Babrak regime, but the American Cultural Center and Friendship House, too. At the same time all embassies in Pakistan should be banned from distributing any kind of literature without obtaining prior permission from the government of Pakistan. It is stressed that if serious consideration is not given to this demand, the consequences will be disastrous.

9484

CSO: 4203

PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

NAVAL BOATS FOR IRAN--Yet another ship weighing 850 tons built for the Iranian Navy will be lowered into the sea at a ceremony at the Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works. Fourteen of the 19 ships ordered by Iran have already been delivered. The remaining ones are under speedy construction. [Text]
[Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 27 May 80 p 3] 9484

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